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INTRODUCTION

This publication completes a major research effort conducted over the past eight years to
determine the effectiveness of providing incentives to unemployed workers to speed their return to
work. This effort represent a portion of a larger research program conducted by the u.s.
Department of Labor to determine effective methods of providing reemployment assistance and/or
incentives to unemployed workers. A series of demonstration projects were launched to increase
employment, improve wages and reduce periods of unemployment..
Recent demonstrations in Illinois, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Washington tested the use of
reemployment bonuses in the unemployment insurance (UI) system. These bonuses provide a cash
payment to claimants who become reemployed quickly, thus providing a monetary incentive for rapid
reemployment. More rapid reemployment of UI claimants wj1l increase earnings and reduce UI
payments. These effects may be large enough to offset the cost to the UI system of providing
bonuses.
The Illinois and New Jersey demonstrations were conducted, respectively, in 1984-85 and 198687. The Illinois demonstration was initiated and sponsored by the State, while the New Jersey
demonstration was initiated and sponsored by the U.S. Department of Labor and operated under a
cooperative agreement with the State. Each of these demonstrations tested a single bonus offer. In
Illinois a fixed bonus amount of $500 was offered, while in New Jersey the value of the initial bonus
offer varied with the prior wage of the unemployed worker and declined over time.
The Washington and Pennsylvania demonstrations, conducted in 1988-89, were also initiated and
sponsored by the U.S. Department of Labor and conducted under cooperative agreements with the
States. These demonstrations, which were initiated because the initial demonstrations proved
promising, tested a range of similar bonus offers that provided alternative bonus amounts and
alternative qualification periods (that is, the period within which a job had to be accepted to qualitY
the claimant for the bonus). By testing a range of offers these demonstrations provided an
opportunity to examine the impact of changes in the bonus parameters.
Independent evaluations of the Pennsylvania and Washington demonstrations were conducted,
respectively, by Mathematica Policy Research and the Upjohn Institute for Employment Research
and are being published simultaneously with this report as UI Occasional Papers.
In this report, similarities between the Pennsylvania and Washington demonstrations have
allowed the authors to develop a combined ("pooled") sample from the two demonstrations. This
combined sample was used to examine the impacts of reemployment bonuses on the receipt of UI
and on employment and earnings. As a result, the authors were able to estimate impacts with greater
precision than had been possible with the separate samples.

Stephen A Wandner
Deputy Director
Office of Legislation and Actuarial
Services
Unemployment Insurance Service
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Unemployment Insurance (UI) program provides short-term income support to involuntarily
unemployed individuals while they seek work. To promote rapid reemployment. the program
currently imposes work-search requirements on UI claimants and refers claimants to the Job Service.
However. policy interest has been expressed in providing additional services to claimants. including
monetary incentives for claimants to seek work on their own. These monetary incentives could be
provided in the form of a reemployment bonus-a lump-sum benefit paid to claimants who become
reemployed quickly. A reemployment bonus would potentially compen~~ for the reemployment
disincentives inherent in the UI system, which pays benefits to claimants for the weeks in which they
remain unemployed.
In 1988 and 1989. demonstrations of reemployment bonus offers (or "treatments") in the UI
program were conducted in Pennsylvania and Washington. These two field tests of a reemployment
bonus differed somewhat according to the rules governing eligibility and the terms of the bonus
offers, but these differences were superseded by similarities that allowed us to merge the samples of
claimants in the separate demonstrations. This report presents our analysis of a merged sample of
27,616 claimants who were eligible for the demonstrations.

DESIGN OF TIlE DEMONSTRATIONS
In both the Pennsylvania and Washington demonstrations, eligible claimants were assigned
randomly either to one of several treatment groups that were offered bonuses or to a control group
that was not offered a bonus. Claimants who were assigned to a treatment were told that they would
receive a lump-sum cash payment if they started a new job by a certain date and remained on that
job for a specified minimum period (approximately 4 months). In both demonstrations. the bonus
qualification period was either short (approximately 6 weeks) or long (approximately 12 weeks), and
the bonus amount was calculated as a multiple of each claimant's VI weekly benefit amount (WBA).
Pennsylvania tested low and high multiples (three times and six times) of the WBA, while Washington
tested three multiples (two. four, and six times) of the WBA To examine the impact of the bonus
offers, we compared outcomes among the combined control group and the various treatment groups.

RESPONSES TO THE BONUS OFFERS
About 13 percent of the claimants assigned to a treatment in either demonstration returned to
work within the bonus qualification period and received a bonus. Among the individual treatments,
the rate of bonus receipt ranged from 7 percent for the low-amount, short-duration bonus offer in
Pennsylvania to 22 percent for the high-amount, long-duration bonus offer in Washington. Both the
amount and duration of the bonus offer significantly affected the probability of bonus receipt. Our
estimates imply that increasing the amount of the offer by $100 would increase the probability of
bonus receipt by 0.8 percentage points, and increasing the duration of the offer by one week would
increase the probability of bonus receipt by 0.9 percentage points. The probability of bonus receipt
appears to have been greater in Washington than in Pennsylvania for similar treatments, even after
controlling for differences in the characteristics of the demonstration samples. This finding suggests
that bonus receipt, while affected by the amount and duration of the bonus offer, is also sensitive to
different program characteristics and different operating environments.

xiii

The bonus offers tested in the demonstrations significantly reduced VI receipt during the benefit
year. Among the individual treatments, the impacts on VI receipt ranged from a negligible increase
of $24 for the low-amount, short-duration bonus offer in Washington to a $146 reduction for the
high-amount. long-duration offer in Washington. The combined average impact of the treatments
was a reduction in VI receipt of $85 per claimant. Both the amount and the duration of the bonus
offer significantly affected the amount of VI benefits received. The estimates imply that increasing
the bonus offer amount by $100 would reduce VI receipt by about $7 per claimant, while increasing
the bonus duration by one week would reduce VI receipt by about $5.50 per claimant. The estimated
impacts of the bonus offers on VI receipt were largest among claimants who were previously
employed in manufacturing industries and among claimants from areas whose unemployment rates
were relatively low.
Because the bonus offers reduced UJ receipt, we also expected to observe an increase in
employment and earnings among claimants assigned to the treatments, but we found little evidence
of such an increase. During the year after benefit application, treatment group members earned an
average of only $7 more than control group members. While the estimates were not precise, we
found some evidence that earnings increased with the dollar amount of the bonus offer and decreased
with the duration of the bonus offer.

BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS
To help policymakers apply the results of our analysis and to summarize the findings, we
conducted an analysis of the net benefits (benefits minus costs) of the bonus demonstrations. Ba~ed
on our estimates, we calculated net benefits for four hypothetical bonus offers, encompassing the four
possible combinations of two bonus amounts ($500 and $1,000) and two bonus qualification periods
(6 weeks and 12 weeks).
These four hypothetical bonus offers would, with one exception, yield positive net benefits for
claimants and for society as a whole. For the two $1,000 bonus offers, claimants would receive bonus
payments that, on average, exceed the UI benefits that they would forego. Consequently, because
the bonus offers would also generate a small increase in earnings, the claimants would receive
estimated net benefits from both $1,000 bonus offers. For the two $500 bonus offers, claimants
would receive bonus payments that are somewhat lower than the UI benefits they would forego.
However, because the bonus offers would also increase earnings slightly, claimants would receive net
benefits from the $500, 6-week offer, and would nearly break even for the $500, 12-week offer.
Society would also receive net benefits from the bonus offers, with the exception of the $500, 12week offer, which would yield a modest net loss for society.
The hypothetical bonus offers would not be cost-effective from the perspective of the UI system,
although the UI system would nearly break even in response to the two $500 bonus offers. The
estimated costs of administering and paying the hypothetical bonus offers exceed the estimated bonusinduced reduction in benefits. The bonus offers would thus generate net losses for the tJI trust
funds, although the losses for the two $500 offers would be less than $7 per claimant. Despite the
estimated net losses for the UI trust funds, two of the bonus offers-those with a qualification period
of 12 weeks-would generate positive net benefits for the government as a whole.

xiv

I. BACKGROUND

The V nemployment Insurance (VI) program provides short-term income support to involuntarily
unemployed individuals while they seek work. Historically, the VI program has used administrative
work-search requirements and referrals to the Job Service to promote rapid reemployment. In recent
years, however, policy interest has been expressed in providing additional services to VI claimants,
including monetary incentives for claimants to seek work on their own. These monetary incentives
can be provided in the form of a reemployment bonus-a lump-sum cash payment to those who
become reemployed or self-employed quickly.

This "reemployment bonus" concept alters the

reemployment incentives of the regular VI system, which pays benefits to claimants for the weeks
they remain unemployed.
Two recent initiatives, the Pennsylvania Reemployment Bonus demonstration and the
Washington Reemployment Bonus demonstration, tested the effects of alternative reemployment
bonuses on the reemployment and VI receipt of VI claimants.

Evaluations of the individual

demonstrations showed that reemployment bonuses reduced the amount of time spent on VI, thereby
reducing benefit payments. 1

Moreover, the demonstrations showed that the benefits of

reemployment bonuses can exceed their costs to society, claimants, and the government. However,
for all but one of the bonus offers tested in the demonstrations, the amount of the bonus payments
plus the administrative costs necessary to offer them exceeded the savings in VI payments. Thus,
reemployment bonuses do not appear to be cost-effective from the standpoint of the VI system.
In this report, we extend the research on reemployment bonuses by examining the VI receipt
and employment and earnings of the combined sample of claimants from both the Pennsylvania and
Washington demonstrations. By merging the two data sets, we can determine with greater certainty

IThe findings for the Pennsylvania demonstration are presented in Corson et al. (1991), and the
findings for the Washington demonstration are presented in Spiegelman et al. (1991).

1

the extent to which the reemployment bonuses affected economic outcomes. We also use the
findings from the merged sample to provide a comprehensive evaluation of the benefits and costs
associated with a reemployment bonus program.
This initial chapter summarizes the characteristics of the demonstrations as they were designed

and the impacts of each demonstration as presented in the corresponding final reports. We also
discuss the process whereby the data sets from the two demonstrations were merged, and describe
the characteristics of the two samples and the states from which they were drawn.

A.

THE CHARACIERISTICS OF THE DEMONSTRATIONS
Both the Pennsylvania and the Washington demonstrations tested several alternative bonus

offers, which differed. according to the amount of the offer and the period for which an individual
qualified for the bonus. In both demonstrations, eligtble claimants were assigned randomly to either
treatment groups that received one of the bonus offers or to a control group that was not offered
a bonus.2 Both demonstrations also incorporated similar bonus claims processes whereby claimants
filed for the bonus payment once they fuIfiIIed the eligtbility requirements.
Although the demonstrations were similar along these general dimensions, the demonstrations
differed in some relatively minor ways. These minor differences may have affected the outcomes for
claimants in the two demonstrations.

In discussing the characteristics of the bonus demonstrations, we focus on three factors-ilie
parameters of the bonus offers, the populations of VI claimants who received bonus offers in the two
demonstrations, and the additional requirements for receiving the bonuses. We discuss these three
factors in the remainder of this section.

2Random assignment ensures that in the absence of the demonstration the outcomes for the
control group members should be similar to those for the treatment group members. Hence, any
differences in the behavior of claimants in the treatment groups can be attnbuted directly to the
treatments.

2

1.

The Bonus Offers
Both the Pennsylvania and the Washington demonstrations tested s~eral alternative bonus offers

that differed according to the amount of the bonus offer and the duration of the bonus qualification
period The various bonus offers that were chosen encompassed the majority of the policy-relevant
reemployment bonus options.
As shown in Table 1.1, the Pennsylvania demonstration tested four different bonus offers based
on two alternative bonus amounts and two alternative qualification periods. The two bonus amounts
included a low amount, which was set at three times the claimant's ill weekly benefit amount (WBA),
and a high amount, set at six times the claimant's WBA The average bonus amounts (in dollars) for
each treatment are shown in Table 1.1.

Th(~

two qualification periods that were tested included a

short period of 6 weeks and a long period of 12 weeks, beginning on the bonus offer date. 3
The Washington demonstration tested six different bonus offers based on three alternative bonus
amounts and two alternative qualification periods. As in the Pennsylvania demonstration, the three
bonus amounts were tied to the claimant's weekly benefit amount (WBA): two times the claimant's
WBA, four times the claimant's WBA, or six times the claimant's WBA The two qualification
periods were tied to the claimant's potentiaX ill duration, measured in weeks: 20 percent of the
claimant's potential ill duration plus one week, or 40 percent of the claimant's potential ill duration
plus one week, both of which began on the Sunday before the date of the initial ill claim. The
average bonus amounts (in dollars) and the average bonus durations (in weeks) for each treatment
group are also presented in Table 1.1.

Jrrhe Pennsylvania design also included fifth and sixth treatments. The fifth treatment tested a
bonus offer that declined gradually from the high amount over a 12-week qualification period, thus
giving claimants an incentive to become reemployed as quickly as possible within the 12-week period
Since this bonus offer was dissimilar to any other Pennsylvania or Washington bonus offer, we
excluded the declining bonus treatment from the pooled analysis. The sixth Pennsylvania treatment
was identical to the fourth treatment, except it excluded the offer of a job-search workshop that
accompanied all of the other treatments. However, so few claimants participated in the workshop
that there was effectively no difference between the groups, and, consequently, we combined the
groups into a new PT4 ~oup.
3

TABLE I.1
THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE REEMPLOYMENT BONUS DEMONSTRATIONS

Washington Demonstration

Pennsylvania Demonstration

Bonus Struc:tun:

The four primary bonus offera took the following form:

Six bonus offers were tested:

Qualification Period

Qualification Period
6 Weeks

12 Weeks

Bonus
Amount

(.2 >< Potential UI
Duration) + 1 Week

(.4 >< Potential UI
Duration) + 1 Week

3><WBA

Treatment 1 (PTl)

Treatment 2 (PT2)

2><WBA.

Treatment 1 (WT1)

Treatment 4 (WT4)

6xWBA

Treatment 3 (pTJ)

Treatment 4 (PT4)

4><WBA

Treatment 2 (Wf2)

TreatmentS (WTS)

6xWBA

Treatment 3 (WT3)

Treatment 6 (WT6)

Bonus Amount

Average bonus parameters:

Average bonus parameters:

",

Average Bonus Amount

Average Qualification
Period

WTl

$302

S.7weeks

12 weeks

WT2

$610

S.8weeks

$1,003

6 weeks

WT3

$917

S.7weeks

$989

12 weeks

WT4

$303

11.0 weeks

WTS

$612

11.0 weeks

WT6

$924

11.1 weeks

Average Bonus
Amount

Average
Qualification Period

PTI

$SOO

6 weeks

PT2

$498

PTJ
PT4

Treatment

Reemployment Bonus Demonstrations

Treatment

TABLE I.1 (continued)

Pennsylvania Demonstration

Washington Demonstration

Additional Servia:s Offered

Voluntary job-search workshop

None

Eligibility Criteria

•
•
•
•
•

Initial claims only
Regular UI claimants
Initially satisfied monetary eligibility conditions
Did not accept employment exclusively through a union
Did not have a specific recall date within 60 days after benefit
application
• Was not separated from job due to a labor dispute
• Signed for a waiting week or _first payment within 6 weeks after
benefit application date

• Initial claims only
• Eligible to receive benefits from the state UI trust fund
• Monetarily valid claims at the time of filing

DeRry of Bonus Offer

Offer made to claimants when they signed for a waiting week or
first payment.

Offer made at the time claimants filed for benefits.

Additional Requirements foe
Rereiviog the Bonus

• 16 weeks of continuous employment (no employment interruption
of more than one week).
~ Did not claim UI benefits during the reemployment period.
• Employment at bonus-qualifying job averaged 32 or more hours
per week.
• MaintJiined monetary and nonmonetary UI eligibility up to the
point of reemployment.

• 4 months of continuous employment (no employment interruption of
more than one week)
• Did not claim UI benefits during the reemployment period.
• Employment at bonus-qualifying job averaged 34 or more hours per
week.
• No separation issue in the initial VI claim that prevented VI benefit
payments during the bonus qualification period.

SOURCES: Washington: Spiegelman et al. (1991); Pennsylvania: Corson et al. (1991).

Reemployment Bonus Demonstrations

Given these designs, the Pennsylvania and Washington demonstrationS tested similar bonus
offers. Some of the individual treatments in the two demonstrations were almost identical-for
example, treatments PT3 and Yf4 in the Pennsylvania demonstration were nearly identical to
treatments WT3 and Wf6 in the Washington demonstration. As shown in Table I.l, the average
bonus amount and duration for PT3 were $1,003 and 6 weeks, while the average bonus amount and
duration for WT3 were $917 and 5.7 weeks. The average bonus amount and duration for Yf4 were
$989 and 12 weeks, while the average bonus amount and duration for Wf6 were $924 and 11.1

2.

The PopulatiOD Who Received a BoDUS Offer

The Washington demonstration offered bonuses to a broader group of UI

cl~ants than

the

Pennsylvania demonstration. The difference in the type of population served by each demonstration
was due to two factors-the eligibility criteria and the timing of the bonus offers.
The Pennsylvania demonstration targeted regular VI claimants who did not have a strong
attachment to their pre-layoff employer, because it was assumed that workers who were attached to
their pre-layoff employer would not be affected by a bonus offer. In order to achieve this objective,
the Pennsylvania demonstration excluded both claimants who had a specific recall date within 60 days
after their VI application and claimants who accepted employment exclusively through a union...
In contrast, the Washington demonstration did not exclude claimants on the basis of employer

or union attachment. In Washington, it was hoped that the bonus offers would encourage these
claimants to seek new jobs and become employed more rapidly than if they relied simply 'on recall
or placement by their union. H these claimants obtained jobs through means other than their

40ne general difference in the bonus designs was that the qualification periods for the
Pennsylvania treatments were constant across claimants, rather than tied to the claimants' maximum
benefit duration, as in the Washington demonstration. However, since over 98 percent of the
claimants in the Pennsylvania had the same maximum benefit duration of 26 weeks, the constant
qualification periods in Pennsylvania also represented a constant proportion of maximum benefit
durations for the majority of claimants.

6

previous employer or union attachment, they were eligIble to receive a bonus. But jf these claimants
were recalled to their previous job or placed on a job through their union hiring hall, they did not
qualify for a bonus.
The timing of the bonus offer also differed across the demonstrations. In the Pennsylvania

,
demonstration, claimants applied for ill benefits just as they would under the regular ill claims
process. Following standard ill guidelines, claimants were scheduled to return to the local office
after two weeks to file for both their waiting week and their first compensable claim. 5 In the period
between the application date and the filing date, applicants were assigned randomly to one of the
treatment groups or to the control group. Qaimants assigned to a treatment group were offered the
bonus when they filed for the waiting week or a first payment. Hence, bonus offers were made only
to claimants who claimed at least a waiting week or a first payment. Any claimants who applied for
benefits but did not subsequently claim a waiting week or a first payment were excluded from the
demonstration.
In the Washington demonstration, claimants were randomized and received bonus offers at their

initial VI application interview, before they signed for a waiting week or a first payment This
difference in the timing of the bonus offers makes the Washington demonstration somewhat more
inclusive, since some of the claimants who received bonus offers in the Washington demonstration
would not have received an offer according to the Pennsylvania design. 6
3.

Additional ReqnireJDents for Receiving the Bonus
In both demonstrations, the individuals who were offered a bonus were subject to a few

additional requirements in order to be eligIble to receive the bonus; with only a few minor exceptions,

5Some claimants, primarily those subject to nonmonetary VI eligIbility issues, were scheduled to
return to the local office one week after their application-filing date to file for their waiting week.
6In their evaluation of the Washington demonstration, Spiegelman et ale (1991) consider the
implications of excluding those claimants who did not subsequently receive VI benefits or serve a
waiting week.
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these requirements were similar in the two demonstrations. For example, in both demonstrations,
bonuses were not paid to claimants who were recalled to their previous job or were placed on a job
through their union hiring hall. These two groups of claimants were denied bonuses because it was
assumed that this type of reemployment outcome was largely outside the control of the worker and
thus would not be affected by the bonus offer.
Other requirements for bonus receipt included the following:

L Reemployment Period. Because the offer of a reemployment bonus offer might prompt
some claimants to accept poorly suited jobs just to claim the bonus, both demonstrations
established safeguards to ensure that such jobs had more than short-term potential. The
Pennsylvania demonstration required that bonus claimants work in their new jobs for 16
weeks before receiving their bonus. Similarly, the Washington demonstration required
that claimants work for 4 months before receiving their bonus. Bothdemonstrations
required that employment be continuous over the reemployment period. In both
demonstrations, claimants were allowed to change jobs during this period as long as both
their employment was not interrupted for more than a week and they did not claim VI
benefits during the reemployment period.

2. Full-lime Employment. In both demonstrations, all bonus-qualifying jobs were required
to be full-time. In the Pennsylvania demonstration, a job was considered to be full-time
if the worker was employed 32 or JJ;lore hours per week and did not collect VI benefits
while he or she was employed in that job. Similarly, in the Washington demonstration,
a job was considered to be full-time if the worker was employed·34 or more hours per
week and did not collect VI benefits while employed.
3. UI Eligibility. In both Pennsylvania and Washington, claimants were required to meet
standard VI eligibility criteria to some extent in order to receive the bonus.
In
Pennsylvania, claimants. were required to maintain both monetary and nonmonetary
eligIbility for VI up to the Point of reemployment. In Washington, bonus recipients were
not allowed to have a separation issue in the initial VI claim that prevented VI benefit
payments during the qualification period.

B.

THE FINDINGS IN THE PENNSYLVANIA AND WASmNGTON FINAL REPORTS
The evaluations of both the Pennsylvania and the Washington demonstrations found that a

reemployment bonus can be implemented successfully as part of the existing VI system, and that the
availability of a bonus offer can reduce the amount of time spent on VI, thereby reducing benefit
payments. In the remainder of this section, we summarize the findings of the evaluations for the
major outcomes of interest.
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1.

Bonus Receipt Rates
Table 12 shows that between 7 and 22 percent of the claimants who were assigned to one of the

10 treatment groups received a bonus payment, depending on the treatment being considered, and
the receipt rates were highest for the most generous bonus offers.

In the Pennsylvania

demonstration, the proportion of treatment group members who received a bonus ranged from about
7 percent for the least generous bonus offer (PT1) to nearly 14 percent for the most generous bonus
offer (PT4). In the Washington demonstration, bonus receipt rates were also higher for the most
generous offers, ranging from about 9 percent for the least generous bonus (WT1) to 22 percent for
the most generous bonus (WT6).
Bonus receipt rates also appear to have been higher in the Washington demonstration than in
the Pennsylvania demonstration. This finding is demonstrated by comparing the bonus receipt rates
for treatments WT3 and WT6 in Washington with the rates for treatments PT3 and PT4 in
Pennsylvania. Since the two sets of treatments were. nearly identical, we would expect that, other
things being equal, they would generate similar bonus receipt rates. However, as shown in Table 1.2,
bonus receipt rates in Washington were 15 percent for WT3 and 22 percent for WT6, substantially
higher than the corresponding Pennsylvania rates of 8 percent for PT3 and 14 percent for PT4. In
Chapter II, we reexamine the bonus receipt rates based on our merged sample of Pennsylvania and
Washington claimants to attempt to determine why the bonus receipt rates were higher in the
Washington demonstration.

2.

Impacts on VI Receipt, Employment, and Earaings
The bonus offers in both the Pennsylvania and the Washington demonstrations generally reduced

ill receipt, with the greatest reductions in ill receipt occurring in response to the most generous
bonus offers. For example, in the Pennsylvania demonstration, the most generous bonus offer (PT4)
had the greatest impact on benefits, reducing average ill receipt by about 0.8 weeks, or $130, per
claimant. The more limited bonus offers-a smaller bonus amount, a shorter qualification period, or
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TABLE I.2
THE F1NDINGS FROM THE REEMPLOYMENT BONVS DEMONSTRATIONS

Pennsylvania Demonstration

Bonus Rea:ipt Rates

Impact on VI Rea:ipt

Impact on Employment and

Washington Demonstration

As a proportion of claimants assigned to each treatment group:

As a proportion of claimants assigned to each treatment group:

Treatment:
PTl. 6.9peroent
PT2. 10.7 percent
PT3. 8.3 percent
PT4. 13.5 percent
All Treatments: 1005 percent

Treatment:
WTl. 8.7 percen t
WT2 124 percent
WT3. 15.0 percent
WT4. 13.9 percent
WT5. 17.8 percent
. WT6.220 percent
All Treatments: 14.6 percent

Impacts on VI receipt in the benefit year:

Impacts on VI receipt in the benefit year:

TreatJDcnt:
PTI. -.65· weeks, -$103" compensation
PT2. ~.36 weeks, -$69 compo
PT3.. -.44 weeks, -$99" compo
PT4. -.82*""weeks, -$l30..• ..comp.

Treatment:
WT1. -.04 weeks, $19 compensation
WTZ. -.27 weeks, ,-$41 compo
WT3. -.70·· weeks, -$107·· compo
WT4.-.62*" weeks, -$117·· compo
WT5. -.26 weeks, -$40 compo
WT6. -.75·" weeks, ·$141·· compo

Overall:

NA

Eamings

Reemployment Bonus Demonstrations

Generally, the treatments had a positive but small and
insignificant impact on postapplication employment or
earnings when wage records were used to measure the
outCQmes. When outcomes were measured with interview
responses, the treatments had a positive but insignificant
impact on employment, but the impacts on earnings were
substantial and significant in some cases.

TABLE 1.2 (continued)

Washington Demonstration

Pennsylvania Demonstration
Benefit-Cost Fmdiogs

Net benefits from social perspective:

Net benefits from social perspective:

Tmltment:
PTl.-$376 per claimant
PT2 $215
PTI. $135
PT4. $172

Treatment:
WTl. -$6 per claimant
WT2 $90
WTI. $266
WT4. $308
WT5. $88
WT6.$349

Net benefits from UI system perspective:
Net benefits from VI system perspective:
Tmltment:
PT!. $30 per claimant
PT2 -$19
PT3. -$25
PT4. -$51

Net benefits from total government perspective:
Tmltment:
PTI. -$64 per claimant
PT2 $35
PTI. $12
PT4. $0

SOURCES: Washington: Spiegelman et aI. (1991); Pennsylvania: Corson et al. (1991).
NA = Not available.
• Statistically significant at the 90 percent confidence level in a two-tail test
.. Statistically significallt at the 95 percent confidence level in a two-tall test
... Statistically significant at the 99 percent confidence level in a two-tail test.

Reemployment Bonus Demonstrations

Treatment:
WTl. -$51 per claimant
WT2 -$42
WTI. -$38
WT4. $68
WT5. -$77
WT6. -$77

Net benefits from total government perspective:
Treatment:
WTl. -$51
WT2. -$28
WTI. $2
WT4. $115
WT5. -$63
WT6. -$24

a bonus that declined over time-reduced UI receipt by an average of about a half a week, or $80,
per claimant. In the Washington demonstration, the most generous bonus offer (Wf6) reduced UI
receipt by 0.75 weeks, or $140, per claimant. As in the Pennsylvania demonstration, the less generous
bonus offers in Washington tended to have smaller impacts on UI receipt.
Because the bonus offers reduced UI receipt, we also expected to observe an increase in
employment and earnings. Given that bonuses were paid only to claimants.who found reemployment,
the bonus offers must have reduced UI receipt because they induced claimants to bewme reemployed
more quickly. If claimants who received bonus offers became reemployed more quickly, they should
also have experienced greater levels of employment and earnings following their benefit application.
The evaluations of the individual demonstrations showed that the bonuses had small but
statistically insignificant impacts on employment and earnings.

The Pennsylvania estimates

demonstrate that the bonus offers in that demonstration probably increased postapplication
employment and earnings for claimants, but the impacts were small. The magnitudes of these
estimated earnings impacts were consistent with the estimated impacts on UI receipt mPennsylvania
discussed above. The Washington final report did not present comparable estimates of the impacts

of the bonuses on earnings or employment for all claimants.7

3.

Benefits and Costs

In both demonstrations, the bonus offers generally yielded net benefits to claimants and to
society as a whole, as shown in Table 12 On average, claimants responded to the bonus offers by
giving up benefits that were approximately equal to the bonus payments they received. Consequently,
because claimants also experienced somewhat greater employment and earnings from having been
offered the bonuses, they received net benefits from the bonus program. Society also derived net

7Both the Pennsylvania and Washington final-reports presented estimated impacts on earnings
for claimants who became reemployed to determine whether the bonuses had a negative effect on
the quality of the postunemployment job. Neither report found evidence that the bonus offers had
an effect on job quality as measured by the earnings of reemployed claimants.
12

benefits from the bonus programs because the earnings gains exceeded the relatively low
administrative costs of the programs. The findings in Table 1.2 demonstrate that three of the four
Pennsylvania bonus offers yielded net social benefits of greater than $100 per claimant, and five of
the six Washington bonus offers generated net social benefits of greater than $100 per claimant.
Although the bonus offers generated net benefits to claimants and to society, they were not costeffective from the perspective of the ill system. The costs of administering and paying reemployment
bonuses in the demonstrations generally exceeded the bonus-induced reduction in ill receipt. The
bonus offers thus imposed modest net losses on the UI trust funds. Nevertheless, the taxes on
increased earnings generated net benefits to the government as a whole for four of the bonus offers
in the two demonstrations. The high-amount, short-duration offers in both demonstrations (PT3 and
WI'3) yielded positive net benefits for the government.

c.

ANALYSIS OF THE MERGED PENNSYLVANIA AND WASHINGTON SAMPLES

In this report we extend the analysis of the Pennsylvania and Washington demonstrations by
evaluating a merged sample of the claimants in the two demonstrations.

Data from the

demonstrations were merged to increase the precision of estimates of the effects of a reemployment
bonus offer.

Because the demonstrations served different populations in different economic

environments, we also wanted to control for these differences as much as possible in using the
merged sample. This section reviews the data merging process, discussing the major decisions that
were made to define the merged sample. We also investigate how the personal characteristics of
Pennsylvania claimants differed from those of the Washington claimants in the merged sample, and
how the economic conditions and demographic characteristics of the two demonstration states
differed.
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1.

FonniDg the Merged Sample

Our general strategy in merging the claimant samples from the two demonstrations was to make
the Pennsylvania and Washington samples as comparable as possible without excluding a large
number of claimants. Qaimants were excluded from the merged sample only if their inclusion would
lead to differences between Pennsylvania and Washington claimants that would present difficulties
for measuring the impacts of the bonus offers. Once the merged sample was created, we estimated
the impacts of the treatments using a regression model that contained control variables to account
for any remaining observable differences between the samples.
As discussed in previous sections, two differences between the demonstrations were the type of
claimants who were eligible for the bonus offers and the timing of the offers. The Pennsylvania
demonstration excluded both claimants who were waiting to be recalled to their previous job within
60 days and claimants who were members of full referral unions, whom the Washington
demonstration did not exclude. In addition, the bonus offer in Pennsylvania was made only after the
waiting week or first payment was claim~ while the offer in Washington was made when claimants
applied for benefits. These differences between the demonstrations imply that the claimants who
were sampled in the two demonstrations should also have differed.
We considered excluding the claimants from the Washington sample who would not be eligible
according to the Pennsylvania design (for example, those who reported that they were full referral
union members) to make the demonstration samples comparable to each other. However, this
approach would have excluded as much as 30 percent of the Washington sample. In addition,
excluding Washington claimants who failed to file for a waiting week or a first payment would also
have been problematic, because we would then have been choosing a sample on the basis of a
variable expected to be affected by the bonus offer.8 To avoid these problems, we kept these
claimants in the sample, and used binary indicators to control for recall expectations and union hiring

8Spiegelman et al. (1991, Chapter 5) discuss this point.
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hall status in conducting the impact analysis. 9 We also tested the alternative approach of excluding
the claimants from the sample, and we found that the consequent estimates were similar to our
estimates derived from including the claimants and using binary indicators to control for stand-by or
union hiring hall status.
2.

The Characteristics of the Samples and the States

The merging process yielded an analysis sample of 27,616 claimants-12,082 claimants from
Pennsylvania and 15,534 from Washington. Included in this sample are 3,354 claimants assigned to
the Pennsylvania control group, and 3,082 claimants assigned to the Washington control group. Since
control group members in both states did not receive a bonus offer, we can use these two groups to
compare the characteristics and UI outcomes for the demonstration-eligIble claimants in the two
states in the absence of a bonus offer.
As shown in Table 1.3, relatively minor differences existed between the control group members

in the two states. In both states, about 16 percent of the claimants were racial minorities, but in
Pennsylvania the minority claimants were primarily black, while in Washington they were distnbuted
evenly among black, Hispanic, and other nonwhite groups.

These racial mixes are generally

representative of the racial distnbutions for the overall populations of those states, which are shown
in Table 104. In addition to the different racial mix, the base-period earnings, weekly benefit amounts,
and potential UI durations of the two samples of claimants also differed. Oaiman1l:s in Pennsylvania
had lower base-period earnings, but received higher weekly benefit amounts than Washington
claimants. Claimants in Washington had longer average potential durations of VI benefits, due to
the 30-week maximum duration in that state, compared with the 26-week limit for Pennsylvania.
In pooling data from the two demonstrations, we must also consider the economic context in
which the separate demonstrations were operated because different economic conditions may lead

~e did not include a binary indicator for waiting week because, by definition, dIis variable would
have depended on the outcome of interest.
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TABLE 1.3
THE CHARACTERISTICS OF CONTROL GROVP MEMBERS
IN EACH DEMONSTRATION

Characteristics

Pennsylvania
Control Group

Washington
Control Group

Gender (Percent)
Female

40.5

39.5

Less than 35 years

53.5

52.2

Age 35 to 54

36.8

39.8

9.7

8.0

White

83.8

83.3

Black

12.1

4.3

Hispanic

3.5

7.0

Other

0.6

5.4

Proportion oil Recall Stand-bt

0.0

14.7

Proportion Full Referral Vnion Membe(l

0.0

7.8

Manufacturing

25.8

23.1

Nonmanufacturing

64.0

76.6

Missing

10.2

0.3

14.13

15.48

Age (Percent)

55 or older
RacelEthnicity (Percent)

Pre-VI Industry (Percent)

Mean Base Period Earnings (Thousands of
Dollars)
Mean Weekly Benefit Amount (Dollars)
Mean Potential VI Duration (Weeks)

164.1

150.5

25.9

26.9

Mean VI Receipt
Number of weeks paid

2,387

2,066

Benefits (dollars)

14.94

14.30

Exhaustion rate (percent)

27.7

23.9

Length of initial VI spell (weeks)

12.52

11.37

Reemployment Bonus Demonstrations
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TABLE 1.3 (continued)

Characteristics

Pennsylvania
Control Group

Washington
Control Group

Proportion Who Applied for VI Benefits in:
First quarter 1988

0.0

6.0

Second quarter 1988

0.0

34.5

Third quarter 1988

1.2

36.6

Fourth quarter 1988

20.5

23.9

First quarter 1989

23.7

0.0

Second quarter 1989

22.0

0.0

Third quarter 1989

25.6

0.0

7.0

0.0

Fourth quarter 1989
Sample Size

3,354

3,082

NOTE: The sample means presented in this table are not regression-adjusted. The full sample
includes 27,616 observations for whom we have data on both demographic characteristics
and VI receipt.
aThis information is relevant only for the Washington sample. Claimants who were on recall stand-by
or who accepted employment exclusively through unions were not eligible for the Pennsylvania
demonstration.

Reemployment Bonus Demonstrations
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TABLE 1.4
THE CHARACfERISTICS OF THE STATES AND
DEMONSTRATION ENROLLMENT SITES

State
Pennsylvania

Washington

Population (1986, in thousands)

11,888

4,132

5,257

3,404

Statewide

265

67

Average across sitf;S

693

90

9.2
2.0
1.2
0.1

3.1
4.4
1.3
1.7

Statewide (1988)

5.1

6.2

Statewide (1989)

4.5

6.2

Across sites (PA 1989, WA 1988)

4.9

6.7

Employment growth (1988 to 1989)

1.9 %

6.8%

Labor-force growth (1988 to 1989)

1.3 %

6.8%

22%
23 %
6%
26%
14 %

18 %
25 %
6%
23 %
19 %

Statewide
Total across sites
Population per ,Square Mile (1986)

Racial Population Subgroups
Statewide (1990, percentages):
Black
Hispanic
Asian and Pacific Islander
Native American, Eskimo, and Aleut
Unemployment Rate (Percentage)

State Employment and Labor-Force Growth

Industry of Employment
Percent of state total (1988):
Manufacturing
Wholesale and retail trade
Finance, insurance, and real estate
Services
Government

Reemployment Bonus Demonstrations
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TABLE 1.4 (continued)
State
Pennsylvania

Washington

New Claims for UI (PA 1989, WA 1988)
Statewide

1,043,877

Percent at demonstration sites

20%

464,715
84%

Average Weekly Wage in UI Covered
Employment (1989)
Statewide

$426

$412

Public Aid Recipients (1989)
Percent of state population

5.8 %

5.8 %

SOURCES: Employment Security Departments of Pennsylvania and Washington; County and City
Data Book, 1988, U.S. Department of Commerce; Statistical Abstract of the United
States, 1990 and 1991, U.S. Department of Commerce; UI Data Summary, various issues
1988 and 1989, U.S. Department of Labor.

Reemployment Bonus Demonstrations
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to differences in the outcomes of interest.

As shown in Table 1.4, Pennsylvania had a lower

unemployment rate (5.1 percent in 1988), but a relatively modest rate of employment growth (1.9
percent between 1988 and 1989). In contrast, Washington had a slightly higher unemployment rate
(6.2 percent in 1989), but a much higher rate of employment growth (6.8 percent between 1988 and
1989). Although one cannot determine conclusively which state had more favorable economic
conditions based on these statistics, it does appear that the Washington economy was expanding much
more rapidly during the demonstration periods.
The distnDutiOns of employment by industry were similar in the two states; Pennsylvania had a
slightly greater percentage in manufacturing, and Washington a larger share in wholesale and retail
trade. Earnings in UI-covered employment and the proportion of the population on public assistance
were nearly identical in the two states.
Demonstration enrollment sites in Pennsylvania handled 20 percent of all VI claims activity,
while those in Washington handled 84 percent of that state's total. This difference is due in part to
differences in the number of sites in which each demonstration operated-12 sites in Pennsylvania
versus 21 sites in Washington. Nonetheless, each sample was representative of its state's racial mix,
as we discussed above. In addition, despite the moderate coverage of state VI activity in the
Pennsylvania demonstration, Corson et al. (1991) report that the insured population in the
demonstration sites was representative of the statewide insured population, according to a variety of
characteristics.

In our estimation procedures, we used regression methods to control for these differences in the
personal characteristics and economic conditions of the Pennsylvania and Washington samples and
among individuals within the samples. In the regressions, we controlled directly for several personal
characteristics, including gender, age, race, industry of previous employment, and earnings prior to
the VI spell. We also controlled for each individual's VI parameters by including the VI weekly
benefit amount and potential UI duration in the regressions. Finally, we controlled indirectly for
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economic conditions by including indicators for the site and time at which claimants entered the
demonstration. The inclusion of these indicators controlled for variations in mean outcomes across
sites (and states) and across time, which were due at least in part to differences in the economic
conditions at different sites (and states) and across time.
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II. BONUS RECEIPT

Claimants who were offered a reemployment bonus and who obtained a job that they believed
qualified for a bonus could submit a daim for a reemployment bonus. In both demonstrations,
claimants submitted a Notice of Hire when they first obtained a job. If the job appeared to meet the
qualifying conditions, the claimants were sent an additional set of forms. Oaimants submitted these
forms once they had been employed for the required minimum period-16 weeks for the Pennsylvania
demonstration and 4 months for the Washington demonstration. Claimants then received a bonus
if they met all qualifying conditions. Corson et al. (1991) and Spiegelman et a1. (1991) report that

this bonus claim process was implemented and operated successfully in the demonstrations.

In this chapter, we examine the rate at which claimants passed through each stage of the bonus
claim process in the two demonstrations. We also investigate how the bonus receipt rates varied
between the demonstrations and how variations in the bonus parameters affected the bonus receipt
rates. Our investigation shows that approximately 13 percent of the claimants who were assigned to
a treatment group in either demonstration were paid a bonus. The bonus receipt rates were higher
for the more generous bonus offers, with both the amount and the duration of the offer having a
significant impact on the bonus receipt rate. In addition, the bonus receipt rates were higher in the
Washington demonstration than in the Pennsylvania demonstration. Given the variety of factors that
affect claimants in the two demonstrations, it is difficult to determine why bonus receipt rates were
higher in Washington than in Pennsylvania However, our findings do suggest that the bonus receipt
rates were sensitive to different program characteristics or different operating environments.

A.

BONUS CLAIM ACfIVITY

As shown in Table 11.1, approximately 30 to 46 percent of the claimants who were assigned to
a treatment group in either of the demonstrations stopped receiving ill benefits within their bonus
qualification period, with the rate varying according to the treatment As expected, in each of the
23

TABLE 11.1
REEMPLOYMENT BONUS CLAIM RATES, BY TREATMENT GROUP

Percent or Claimanll In a Treatment Group Who:

Submitted a Notice
or Hire
Stopped
Receiving Ul
within the Bonus
Qualification
Period

Asa
Proportion
oC the
Previous
Category

Asa
Proportion
oC the

PT1

29.8

PT2

Were Potentially
E1i1lble Based on the
Notice or Hire

Submitted a Bonus
Voucher

Were Paid a Bonus
Asa
Proportion
of the

Sample

Asa
Proportion
or the
Previous
Category

Sample

Sample
Size

826

7.1

97.2

6.9

1,385

127

88.2

11.2

96.4

10.8

2,428

81.8

9.9

86.9

8.6

96.5

8.3

1,885

18.7

824

15.4

90.3

13.9

97.1

13.5

3,030

41.4

1S.l

821

124

87.9

10.9

97.2

10.6

8,728

41.0

125

88.8

11.1

829

9.2

94.6

8.7

2,246

A

JJ."'t

.0
"
IO.V

n~n

J_J

U

"~I.

16.6

au

13.5

91.9

124

2,348

WT3

35.3

57.5

20.3

91.6

18.6

89.8

16.7

89.8

15.0

1,583

WT4

424

45.8

19.4

89.2

17.3

83.2

14.4

96.5 .

13.9

2,387

WT5

428

53.3

228

93.0

21.2

88.7

18.8

94.7

17;8

2,353

WT6

45.8

59.8

27.4

93.8

25.7

91.1

23.4

94.0

220

1,535.

All Washington Treatment Groups
Combined

38.0

51.6

19.6

91.8

18.0

86.1

15.5

94.2

14.6

12,452

37.4

47.6

17.8

88.2

15.7

86.6

13.6

94.9

129

21,180

Asa
Proportion
or the

Sample

Asa
Proportion
oC the
Previous
Category

Asa
Proportion
oC the

Sample

Asa
Proportion
oC the
Previous
Category

39.3

11.7

73.5

8.6

39.0

38.2

14.9

85.2

PT3

31.4

38.5

121

PT4

40.6

46.1

All Pennsylvania Treatment Groupe
Combined

36.5

WT1

30.5

Wf2

.....

Treatment Group

Full

Full

Full

Full

Pc:DDIIJlvuUa TrcatlDalt Groupa

f',)

.J::-

WubiDpo Trcatmeat Gtoup

All Pc:imayhuia aad WlIIIIlIqtoa

~

'TP:iatmeat Groupa Combiacd

NOTE:

'Ine reemployment bonu. claim ratel are not regrelliion.adjusted. The full sample includes 21,180 treatment group members (or whom we have dal8 on demographic cll8racteri.t1cs.

demonstrations, the rate at which claimants stopped receiving VI within the qualification period was
higher for treatments whose qualification periods were longer. The amount of the bonus offer also
appears to have affected this VI exit rate, with higher bonus amounts leading to higher VI exit rates.
Because the Pennsylvania and Washington demonstrations operated in different environments
and established different eligibility criteria for defining the treatment groups, we would expect that
the rates at which treatment group members exited VI and claimed a bonus would also differ between
the two demonstrations. Given that PT3 and PT4 in the Pennsylvania demonstration were nearly
identical to Wf3 and WT6 in the Washington demonstration, we can use these treatment groups to
compare bonus claim activities in the two interventions.
A comparison of the VI exit rates for these comparable treatment groups shows that the rates
were higher in the Washington demonstration than in the Pennsylvania demonstration. For example,
nearly 46 percent of the Washington claimants who were assigned to WT6 exited VI during the
qualification period, compared with approximately 41 percent of the Pennsylvania claimants in PT4.
That the VI exit rates were higher in the Washington demonstration than in the Pennsylvania
demonstration is not surprising, since the Washington sample includes employer·· and union-attached
workers, who were excluded from the Pennsylvania sample. Since these workers were expected to
find new jobs relatively quickly, their inclusion in the Washington sample should increase the UI exit
rate for that sample. However, since these claimants were not eligible to receive a bonus payment
if they were recalled or found employment through· their union, we would not expect that the

differences in eligibility criteria would necessarily generate differences in other measures of bonus
claim activity.
About 18 percent of the claimants who were assigned to a treatment group submitted a Notice
of Hire, as shown in Table 11.1. As was the case with VI exit rates, the rates at which Notices of
Hire were submitted were higher for treatments in which higher bonus amounts were offered for
longer qualification periods. The combined group of Pennsylvania and Washington claimants who
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submitted a Notice of Hire represents nearly 50 percent of the claimants who exited VI during their
qualification period. Table II.! also demonstrates that the Washington claimants who exited VI
during the qualification period were more likely to submit a Notice of Hire than were Pennsylvania
claimants who exited VI. For example, the Notice of Hire submission rates as a percentage of
claimants who exited VI were 58 and 60 percent for the WT3 and WT6 groups, compared with 39
and 46 percent for the PT3 and PT4 groups. This finding is surprising, given the inclusion of
employer- and union-attached claimants in the Washington demonstration. Since it was made clear
that claimants would not be eligible for a reemployment bonus if they were recalled to their pre-VI
job or were reemployed through their union, claimants with a previous job or union attachment were
probably less likely to submit a Notice of Hire. Thus, one would expect that the inclusion of these
claimants would reduce the Notice of Hire submission rate for the Washington demonstration relative
to the rate for Pennsylvania. However, our findings run counter to this expectation.
Approximately 88 percent of the claimants who submitted a Notice of Hire in either
demonstration were judged to be potentially eligible for the bonus, according to the information on
the Notice of Hire. The rate was higher in the Washington demonstration-92 percent, compared
with 82 percent in Pennsylvania.
All claimants who were judged to be potentially eligible according to the Notice of Hire were
sent a bonus voucher, and about 87 percent of these claimants submitted the voucher after the
minimum period of employment. The voucher submission rates as a percentage of claimants who
were sent vouchers were similar across the two demonstrations. Nearly 95 percent of the claimants
who submitted a bonus voucher in either demonstration were judged to be eligible for a bonus and
received a payment. This bonus receipt rate as a percentage of voucher submissions was slightly
higher among the Pennsylvania claimants than among the Washington claimants.
Overall, 13 percent of the claimants who were assigned to a treatment group also received a
bonus. Again, the highest rates occurred for the high-amount, long-duration bonus offers. The bonus
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receipt rates were also higher for the Washington demonstration than for the Pennsylvania
demonstration. For example, 22 percent of the Washington claimants in WT6 received a bonus,
compared with only 13.5 percent of the claimants in the similar treatment in Pennsylvania (PT4). The
numbers in Table II.l suggest that the differences in the Pennsylvania and Washington receipt rates
arise partly because the Washington claimants were more likely to submit a Notice of Hire, and partly
because Washington claimants who submitted Notices of Hire were more likely to be judged eligIble.
One potential explanation for the higher bonus receipt rate in the Washington demonstration
is that the characteristics of claimants in or the operating environments of the two states differed.

To investigate this possibility, we calculated regression-adjusted bonus receipt rates based on a model
of the probability of bonus receipt. These estimates, which are presented in Table 11.2, show that
the differential bonus receipt rate in the two demonstrations was even larger after controlling for
individual characteristics and the geographical locations of the sample members.

Hence, the

differential bonus receipt rate cannot be explained by the personal characteristics of claimants in the
separate demonstrations. The differences in ,the bonus receipt rate therefore must be due to either
the characteristics of claimants or environmental factors not captured by our regression or to
differences in the implementation or operation of the demonstrations.

B.

THE IMPACfS OF THE BONUS PARAMETERS ON BONUS RECElYI'

In the previous section, we examined the bonus receipt rate and other measures of bonus claim

activity by focusing on the individual treatment groups. An alternative approach is to use measures
of the bonus parameters to explain whether individuals received a bonus. To estimate these effects,
we entered the appropriate bonus amount (measured in hundreds of dollars) and the bonus duration
(measured in weeks) into a regression equation to explain the probability that claimants received a
bonus. The sample for which this equation was estimated includes only claimants who were assigned
to a treatment group in either of the demonstrations, and the dependent variable in the equation is
a binary indicator that equals one if the claimant received a bonus and zero if the claimant did not.
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TABLE 11.2
REGRESSION-ADJUSTED BONUS RECEIPT RATES,
BY TREATMENT GROUP

Treatment Group

Percent of Claimants
Paid a Bonus

Sample Size

Pennsylvania Treatment Groups

PT1

6.9

1,385

PTZ

10.5

2,428

PTI

8.2

1,885

PT4

1304

3,030

All Pennsylvania Treatment Groups
Combined

lOA

8,728

WT1

lOA

2,246

WT2

13.9

2,348

WT3

16.5

1,583

WT4

15.5

2,387

WT5

19.2

2,353

WT6

23.3

1,535

All Washington Treatment Groups
Combined

17.7

12,452

Washington Treatment Groups

NOTE: The estimates are based on a linear probability (least squares) model of individual bonus
receipt. The sample includes 21,180 treatment group members for whom we have data on
both demographic characteristics and bonus rec.'ipt. The explanatory variables contained
in the regressions include treatment indicators, cohort indi, ,tors, office indicators, and
demographic and economic variables. The indicator forPTl was excluded from the
regression, and the bonus receipt rate for PT1 presented in this table is the simple
unadjusted rate. The bonus receipt rates for the other treatment groups are regressionadjusted rates, derived from using the rate for PTI as a base for calculating the adjusted
rates for the other groups.
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The estimates presented in Table ll3 demonstrate that both the amount and the duration of the
bonus offer had a significant impact on whether an individual received a bonus. The estimates based
on the combined Pennsylvania and Washington bonus offers imply that increasing the bonus amount
by $100 would increase the probability of bonus receipt by 0.8 percentage points. A one-week
increase in the bonus qualification period would increase the probability of bonus receipt by 0.9
percentage points. Both of the these impacts are statistically significant at the 99 percent confidence
level.
The estimates in Table 11.3 also show that changes in the bonus amount or duration had a larger
impact on the probability of bonus receipt in the Washington demonstration than in the Pennsylvania
demonstration. For example, the estimated impact of the bonus amount based on the Washington
offers (.94 percent per $1(0) is more than 50 percent larger than the corresponding estimate for the
Pennsylvania offers (.61 percent per $1(0). The impact of the duration of the bonus offer is also
greater for the Washington demonstration than for the Pennsylvania demonstration, by about a onethird

The findings on the impacts of the amount and the duration of the bonus offer on bonus receipt
suggest that the receipt rates for a given bonus offer should differ substantially according to the
location of the bonus program. One factor that may explain the differential effects of the bonus
amount and the duration of the bonus offer in the two demonstrations is the different economic
conditions in the two states. For example, we argued in Chapter I that during the demonstration the
Washington economy was expanding at a greater rate than was the Pennsylvania economy. Thus,
Washington claimants may have been more likely to become reemployed more quickly in response
to a bonus offer because more opportunities for reemployment were available to them. Such
differences between the states may have also made Washington claimants more responsive to
differences in the amount or duration of the bonus offers in terms of becoming reemployed and
receiving a bonus.
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TABLE I1.3
ESTIMATED IMPAcrs OF CONTINUOUS
BONUS PARAMETERS ON PROBABILITY OF BONUS RECEIPT
(Standard Errors in Parentheses)

Estimates Based
on Combined
Pennsylvania
and Washington
Bonus Offers
(Percent)

Estimates
Based on
Pennsylvania
Bonus Offers
Only
(Percent)

Estimates
Based on
Washington
Bonus Offers
Only
(Percent)

Amount of Bonus
Offer (hundreds of
dollars)

0.78 ***
(0.09)

0.61 ***
(0.11)

0.94 ***
(0.11)

Duration of Bonus
Offer (weeks)

0.89 ***
(0.08)

0.76 ***
(0.12)

0.99 ***
(0.11)

NOTE: The estimates presented in this table are based on linear probability (least squares) models
of bonus receipt. The sample includes 21,180 treatment group members for whom we have
data on both demographic characteristics and bonus receipt. The explanatory variables
contained in the regressions include bonus-parameter variables, cohort indicators, office
indicators, and demographic and economic variables.
***Statistically significant at the 99 percent ~confidence level in a two-tail test.
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In Table ITA, we use the estimates presented in Table ll.3 to calculate predicted bonus receipt

rates for four hypothetical bonus offers. For simplicity, we have specified hypothetical bonus offers
whose bonus amount and qualification period are constant-the amount and duration of the
hypothetical bonus offers do not vary among claimants. The hypothetical offers were chosen so as
to encompass the majority of policy-relevant bonus options. We derived the predicted receipt rates
from the regression model that underlies Table 11.3 by setting the explanatory variables, except the
bonus amount and the bonus duration, equal to their sample means. The bonus amount and duration
variables were set to the values associated with the particular hypothetical bonus offer of interest.
The resulting predicted value can be interpreted as the predicted rate of bonus receipt for the
hypothetical bonus offer, other factors being equal.
The hypothetical bonus offers presented in Table ll.4 would generate bonus receipt rates of 9
percent to 18 percent, depending on the bonus parameters. Based on our estimates, about 9 percent
of the claimants who receive a bonus offer of $500 for a 6-week qualification period would actually
receive a bonus. Doubling the bonus amount and duration to $1,000 and 12 weeks would in turn
double the bonus receipt rate, to just over 18 percent. The combination of a low amount with a long
duration or a high amount with a short duration would yield bonus receipt rates of 14.4 percent and
12.9 percent, respectively.

C.

THE IMPACfS OF INDIVIDUAL CHARACfERISTICS ON BONUS RECEIYf
In this section, we investigate how individual characteristics affected the probability of bonus

receipt. The estimated effects of individual characteristics on the probability of bonus receipt are
based on the coefficients on characteristic variables from the model of bonus receipt discussed in the
previous section.
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TABLE 11.4
PREDICTED BONUS RECEIPT RATES FOR FOUR HYPOTHETICAL
BONUS OFFERS, BASED ON TIlE CONTINUOUS MODEL

Hypothetical Bonus
Offer

Amount of
Bonus Offer

. Duration of Bonus
Qualification Period

Predicted Percent
of Claimants
Paid a Bonus

1

$500

6 Weeks

9.0

2

$500

12 Weeks

14.4

3

$1,000

6 Weeks

12.9

4

$1,000

12 Weeks

18.3

NOTE: The predicted bonus receipt rates are based on the linear probability (least squares)
estimates presented in Table 11.3. The formula used to calculate the receipt rate is: -0.20
+ (AMOUNT x 0.78) + (DURATION )( 0.89). This formula is derived from setting all
explanatory variables in the linear probability equation, except AMOUNT and DURATION,
equal to their sample means. AMOUNT and DURATION are set to the appropriate
values for the hypothetical bonus offer.
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While we can use the estimated coeffidents from this model to explain how the probabilities of
bonus receipt varied among different typeli. of claimants, we cannot use these estimates to explain
fully why different claimants had different probabilities of bonus receipt. Three factors may explain
why the bonus receipt rate among one group of claimants would be higher than the rate among
another group, other things being equal. First, a group of claimants may have been relatively more
likely to find a job within the qualificatiolll period, thus making them more likely to be at least
partially eligible to receive a bonus. Second, a group of claimants may have been relatively more
likely to find a job that was bonus-eligIble. Third, a group of claimants may have been relatively more
likely to apply for the bonus. We attempted to separate out the first of these factors by presenting
estimated coefficients from a regression model that measured the effect of individual factors on the
probability of finding a job within the qualification period. However, in assessing our estimates, we
were not able to distinguish fully which of the three factors was responsible for the differential bonus
receipt probabilities among different types of claimants.

Thus, part of our approach entailed

speculating about the specific factors that might explain why the bonus receipt probability for one
group of claimants is higher than for another group.
The estimated impacts of individual cbaracteristics on bonus receipt, presented in the second
column of Table ll.5, show that the gender of a claimant had no impact on the probability of bonus
receipt-women received bonuses at about the same rate as did men, other things being equal. The
estimates in the first column of Table II.5 show that the bonus receipt rates for men and women were
similar despite the fact that men were more: likely to exit UI during the bonus qualification period.
One explanation for this difference may be that, although men were more likely to exit UI, they were
also more likely to be recalled to their previous job and thus more likely to be denied a bonus
payment. In this case, women would receive bonuses at the same rate as would men, despite being
less likely to find employment and to exit UI during the bonus qualification period.
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TABLE 1I.5
ESTIMATED IMPACI'S OF INDIVIDUAL CHARACIERISTICS ON
BONUS QUALIFICATION AND BONUS RECEIPT
(Standard Errors in Parentheses)

Estimated Impact on the
Probability That a Claimant:

Explanatory Variable
(Binary Indicators)

Female

Exited VI During the
Bonus Qualification
Period (Percent)

Received a Bonus
Payment (Percent)

Proportion of
Sample (Percent)

-3.0·"
(0.7)

(0.5)

Black

1.6
(1.5)

-6.7 ...
(1.0)

7.4

Hispanic

-3.0 •
(1.7)

-4.8 ...
(1.1)

5.4

Other Nonwhite

2.1
(2.0)

-3.9 ...
(1.4)

3.1

Younger Than 35 Years

7.5 ...
(0.7)

1.4 ...
(0.5)

53.6

55 Years or Older

-5.1 ...
(1.2)

-5.6 ...
(0.9)

8.5

Recall Stand-~

7.1 ...
(1.4)

-8.2 ...
(1.0)

7.9

Full Referral Union MemJ>erll

-1.2
(1.6)

-10.5 ...
(1.1)

4.8

-1.6 ..
(0.6)

23.8

-0.3

39.3

Race

Job A1taduneDt

Pre-ill InduslIy
Manufacturing

NOTE:

1.7 ..
(0.8)

The estimates are based on linear probability (least squares) models of VI exit and bonus receipt. The sample includes 21,180
treatment group members for whom we have data on both demographic characteristics and bonus receipt.

aEstimated coefficients on these variables are based on Washington claimants only. Claimants who were on recall stand-by or accepted
employment exclusively through unions were not eligible for the Pennsylvania demonstration.
• Statistically significant at the 90 percent <:onfidence level in a two-tail test.
.. Statistically significant at the 95 percent c:onfidence level in a two-tail test.
... Statistically significant at the 99 percent c:onfidence level in a two-tail test.
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Several other factors had a significalllt impact on the probability of bonus receipt.

Blacks,

Hispanics, and other non-white claimants Wl~re much less likely to receive a bonus, other things being
equal. The largest impact occurred for black claimants, whose probability of receiving a bonus was
nearly 7 percentage points lower than the probability for whites. This impact represents more than
half of the bonus receipt rate for the full treatment sample, which was equal to 13 percent. The
differential bonus receipt rates of whites relative to other racial groups may reflect the difficulty
experienced by nonwhite groups in finding reemployment. However, the first column of estimates
in Table II.5 show that black claimants and other nonwhite claimants were about as likely as white
claimants to exit VI during the bonus qualification period. Hence, the racial differences in bonus
receipt rates cannot be attnbuted to race-specific differences in the average time to reemployment
or VI exit. Spiegelman et aI. (1991) discussed a similar finding based on the Washington data and
concluded that the differences in bonus receipt rates by race must reflect differences in intervening
factors that affect either their qualificatiOlll for the bonus or their probability of applying for the
bonus.
Older claimants were significantly less likely than younger claimants to receive a bonus. The
impact of being older than 55 years was especially strong; the bonus receipt probability for these older
claimants was nearly 6 percentage points lower than the probability for middle-age claimants (35 to
54 years) and 8 percentage points lower than for young claimants (younger than 35 years). The
impact of the age indicators probably reflects, the ability ofyounger claimants to find new employment
and exit VI more quickly than can older claimants, especially those older than 55. The estimates for
VI exit are consistent with this argument, showing that younger workers were more likely than older
workers to exit UI during the qualification period. .
As expected, claimants who were on ~ stand-by or were full referral union members were
much less likely than other claimants to receive a bonus. Although these claimants have the potential
to become reemployed quickly, they were ineligible to receive a bonus if they returned to their
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previous job or found employment through their union. The findings for bonus receipt suggest that
many of these claimants maintained their job or union attachment, foregoing the opportunity to
receive a reemployment bonus by breaking the attachment and finding a new job.
Qaimants were also less likeiy to receive a bonus if they were previously employed in a

.

manufacturing industry. This finding may also be related to job attachment. Many claimants who
were not specified as recall stand-by claimants were still recalled to their previous employer, and the
probability of recall is traditionally higher in manufacturing industries than in nonmanufacturing
industries. Since recalled claimants were ineligible to receive a bonus, a higher recall probability in
manufacturing would reduce the probability of bonus receipt among claimants in manufacturing. An
alternative explanation is that manufacturing claimants faced greater difficulty in finding
reemployment than their nonmanufacturing counterparts. Based on this explanation, manufacturing
claimants were less likely to receive a bonus because they were less likely to become reemployed

within the qualification period. However, the findings for VI exit in the first column of Table

n.s

show that manufacturing workers were more rather than less likely than nonmanufacturing workers
to exit VI during the bonus qualification period. Hence, inter-industry differences in the probability
of recall are probably a more reasonable explanation for the lower bonus receipt among
manufacturing workers than are inter-industry differences in the timing of reemployment.

36

ill. IMPACTS ON UI RECEIPT

The Pennsylvania and Washington demonstrations were expected to reduce VI benefit receipt
among eligtble claimants by inducing them to find reemployment quickly. The findings from the
demonstration evaluations show that, the bonus offers in the two demonstrations generally reduced

VI receipt among claimants who received an offer (Corson et al., 1991; and Spiegelman et al., 1991).
The largest VI reductions occurred in response to the most generous bonus offers-the highest bonus
amounts for the longest qualification periods..

In this chapter, we examine the combined sample of claimants from both of the demonstrations
to extend the analysis of VI receipt.

Our c::stimates based on this combined sample confirm the

findings presented in the Pennsylvania aIlld Washington final reports-that the bonus offers
significantly reduced UI receipt. The average impact of the bonus offers was a reduction in UI
receipt of half a week, or $85. The largest impacts occurred in response to the most generous bonus
offers with the longest qualification periods, which reduced average VI receipt by about 0.8 weeks,
or $140, in the two demonstrations. Our estimates based on the parameters of the bonus offers
demonstrate that both the amount and the duration of the bonus offer had a significant impact on
VI receipt among claimants.
We also estimated the impacts of the treatments on VI receipt among subgroups of claimants
to determine the types of claimants who were affected to the greatest extent by the bonus offers.

Our findings demonstrate that the impacts were significantly larger among claimants from nondurable
manufacturing industries than among claiman.ts from nonmanufacturing industries. The impacts were
also significantly larger among claimants from areas whose unemployment rates were low than among
claimants from areas whose unemployment rates were moderate or high. The impacts did not vary
significantly across gender, race, or age subgroups.
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A.

MEI'HODOLOGY

We used four measures of lJI benefit receipt for our analysis of the impact of the treatments on
VI receipt: (1) the number of weeks for which each claimant was paid benefits in the benefit year,
(2) the dollar amount of VI benefits paid to claimants in the benefit year, (3) whether claimants
exhausted their benefits, and (4) the number of weeks in the initial VI spell. We considered both
weeks paid in the benefit year aIlId weeks in the initial VI spells, in order to distinguish between the
impacts which led to temporary withdrawals from VI and the impacts which had longer-term
consequences for insured unemployment.

Our simplest regression model for estimating the impacts of the individual bonus offers on VI
receipt contained binary indicators for each of the 10 treatments in the demonstrations. We also
estimated the impacts of the bonus offers according to the parameters of the offers. Since the bonus
offers in the Pennsylvania and Washington demonstrations varied primarily along two dimensions-the
amount of the bonus offer and the length of the qualification period-we can evaluate the effect of
varying the bonus amount and the duration. of the bonus offers on VI receipt. We carried out this
analysis by replacing the treatment group indicators in our regressions with a set of explanatory
variables that controlled for the amount and the duration of the offer.
The regressions also contained variables to control for the individual characteristics of claimants,
the timing of sample selection, and the UI office to which claimants reported. Two factors motivated
our using regression-adjusted estimates to control for these factors. Frrst, we used the regressions
to control for the timing of sample~ selection because the proportion of claimants assigned to different
treatment groups in the Pennsylvania demonstration varied over time. l Hence, despite random
assignment, the treatment and control groups differed according to when the claimants in the groups
entered the demonstration, on average. Second, the regression estimates allowed us to control for
any differences in characteristics that existed between individuals when we measured the impacts of
lCorson et al. (1991), Chapter ill, discuss the reasons for and the details of the changes in sample
allocation.
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the treatments. Although random assignment to treatment groups was used within the individual
demonstrations, claimants in the Pennsylvania demonstration differed from claimants in the
Washington demonstration, as shown in Table 1.3 in Chapter I. Therefore, the average characteristics
of claimants in a given treatment group depend on the demonstration in which that treatment group
participated. Since we estimated impacts based on a sample that contained both Pennsylvania and
Washington claimants, we wanted to control as much as possible for the interstate differences in the
characteristics of claimants.

The regressions also controlled for within-group variation in the

characteristics of claimants, which allowed us to derive more statistically precise estimates of the
impacts of the treatments.

B.

IMPACTS OF INDIVIDUAL TREATMENTS ON UI RECEIPT
The mean VI outcomes for Pennsylvania and Washington claimants presented in Table ill.1

show that, in the absence of a reemployment bonus, the control group in Pennsylvania collected VI
longer and received more benefits than the control group in Washington. The control group in the
Pennsylvania demonstration received an average of nearly 15 weeks of benefits, which was
approximately 5 percent more in benefits than the Washington control group members, who received
an average of 14.3 weeks of benefits. The differences in dollars of VI receipt were even larger:
Pennsylvania control group members received an average of $2,387, compared with an average of
$2,066 for Washington control group mem1Jers-.,a difference of approximately 15 percent.
Pennsylvania control group members were also more likely to exhaust their benefits-27.7 percent
among the Pennsylvania control group members, compared with 23.9 percent among the Washington
control group members.
These control-group differences in meaIll VI receipt are at least partly attnbutable to controlgroup differences in average VI weekly benefit amounts and potential VI durations. Table 1.2 shows
that the average weekly benefit amount among the Pennsylvania control group was $14 greater than

39

TABLE III.1
MEAN UI OUTCOMES BY TREATMENT GROUP

UIOutcome

Treatment Group

Weeks of
Benefits
Received in
Benefit Year

Dollars of
Benefits
Received in
Benefit Year

Rate of
Benefit
Exhaustion
(Percent)

Duration of
Initial
.UI Spell
(Weeks)

Sample Size

Pennsylvania Demoostration
Groups
Control Group

14.~)4

2,387

27.7

12.52

3,354

PT1

14.53

2,363

29.0

1254

1,385

PT2

14.50

2,336

27.5

11.88

2,428

PTI

14.45

2,323

27.5

12.11

1,885

PT4

14.1)2

2,247

25.1

11.78

3,030

Control Group

14.30

2,066

23.9

11.37

3,082

WT1

14.7A

2,096

25.1

11.47

2,246

WT2

14.11

2,071

23.6

11.37

2,348

WT3

13.(>8

1,997

22.7

11.10

1,583

WT4

13.80

2,007

21.0

11.10

2,387

WT5

14.1l6

2,078

22.6

11.60

2,353

WT6

1357

1,979

21.6

10.55

1,535

WasbiDgIon Demoostration
Groups

NOTE:

The sample means presented in this table are not regression-adjusted. The full sample includes 27,616 observatiqns for whom
we have data on both demographic characteristics and UI receipt.
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the average weekly benefit amount among the Washington control group. This difference partly
explains why Pennsylvania claimants colllxted more VI dollars than Washington claimants. The
difference in potential VI duration, which was one week less among Pennsylvania claimants than
among Washington claimants, probably contnbute-d to the higher rate of benefit exhaustion among
Pennsylvania claimants. Other things being equal, we would expect that a claimant whose potential
VI duration is short would be more likely to exhaust his or her allotment of benefits than would a
claimant whose potential VI duration is longer.
Two other factors contributed to the relatively greater VI receipt among Pennsylvania control
group members. First, as we argued in Chapter I, the Pennsylvania economy was expanding less
rapidly than the Washington economy during the demonstrations.

Consequently, Pennsylvania

claimants may have had fewer reemployme:nt opportunities than did Washington claimants, and thus
Pennsylvania claimants also remained unemployed longer, stayed on VI longer, and received more
UI benefits.

Second, differences in the eligIbility criteria in the demonstrations may also have

contributed to the observed differences in VI receipt For example, the Pennsylvania demonstration
excluded claimants who expected to be rlecalled to their previous job within 60 days, while such
claimants were included in the Washington demonstration. Since these claimants were likely to
return to work quickly, they were also likely to receive relatively less VI benefits than were other
claimants. Thus, the inclusion of these claimants, in the Washington demonstration drives down
average VI receipt among the Washington sample relative to the Pennsylvania sample.

Using

regressions to explain VI receipt enabled us to control to some extent for these and other less
obvious differences in the demonstratiollis ,vhen we compared average VI receipt among the
Pennsylvania and Washington treatment and control groups.
The regression-adjusted impact estimates presented in Table ill2 confirm the findings presented
in the Pennsylvania and Washington final reports-that the bonus offers generally reduced VI receipt
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TABLE m.2
lHE ESTIMATED IMPACTS OF lHE
TREATMENTS ON VI OUTCOMES
(Standard Errors in Parentheses)

UIOutcome

Weeks of Benefits
Received in Benefit
Year

Dollars of Benefits
Received in Benefit
Year

Rate of
Benefit Exhaustion
(Percent)

Duration of
Initial
VI Spell
(Weeks)

Pennsylvania Treatments

PTI

-.63 •
(.34)

-100 •
(55)

0.2
(1.4)

-.22
(.33)

PTZ

-.39
(.28)

-73
(46)

0.1
(1.1)

-.58 ..
(.27)

PTI

-.46
(.30)

-99 ••
(50)

0.1
(1.2)

-.40
(.29)

-133 ...
(43)

-1.6
(1.1)

-.69·"
(.26)

-.84 •••

PT4

(.26)
WasbiDgtoo Treatments

WTI

-.04
(.29)

24
(48)

0.8
(1.2)

.07
(.28)

WT2

-.25
(.29)

-32
(47)

-0.5
(1.2)

-.12
(.28)

(.32)

-118 ..
(53)

-1.6
(1.3)

-.44
(.31)

WT4

-.59 ..
(.29)

-116 ..
(47)

-3.2 ...
(1.2)

-.40
(.28)

WT5

-.31
(.29)

-2.0 •
(1.2)

-.02
(.28)

WT6

-.80 ..
(.33)

-146 ...
(54)

-2.1
(1.3)

(.32)

-.51 ...
(.15)

-85 ...
(25)

(0.6)

-.71 ..

WT3

Combined Treatments

Combined Control Group Mean

NOTE:

-52
(47)

14.63

2,233

-t.O

25.9

-.84 ...

-.39·"
(.15)
11.97

Estimates are regression-adjusted. The sample includes 27,616 observations for whom we have data on both demographic
characteristics and UI receipt. The explanatory variables in the regressions include treatment indicators, cohort indicators,
office indicators, and demographic and economic variables.

• Statistically significant at the 90 percent confidence level in a two-tail test.
.. Statistically significant at the 95 percent confidence level in a two-tail test.
... Statistically significant at the 99 percent confidence level in a two-tail test.
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in both demonstrations. The average impac:t of the bonus offers was a reduction in VI receipt of half
a week, or $85, per claimant. Both of these estimates are significant at the 99 percent confidence
leveL The largest impacts occurred for the most generous bonus offers with the longest qualification
periods (PT4 in the Pennsylvania demonstration and WT6 in the Washington demonstration). The
Pennsylvania treatment PT4 reduced VI receipt by .84 weeks, or by $133. The Washington treatment
WT6 reduced VI receipt by .80 weeks, or by $146. These Pennsylvania and Washington impacts

represent at least 5 percent of the corresponding average VI outcomes for the combined control
group, and the impacts are statistically significant at the 95 or 99 percent confidence levels.
The other treatments, whose bonus amounts and durations were more limited than those in
either PT4 or WT6, generated smaller impacts on VI receipt. The estimated reductions in weeks of
VI receipt generated by the other bonus offers ranged from .04 weeks for WT1 (low amount, short

duration) to .63 weeks for PT1 (low amount, short duration) and .71 weeks for WT3 (high amount,
short duration). When measured in dollars of benefits, the impacts of the more limited bonus offers
were again less than the impacts of the most generous bonus offers, ranging from an estimated $24
increase in VI receipt for WT1 (low

amoun1~

short duration) to an estimated $118 reduction in VI

receipt for WTI (high amount, short duration). The findings for treatments PT1 and WT4 are
somewhat anomalous because they imply that two of the smallest-amount bonus offers had relatively
large impacts, reducing VI receipt by .63 weeks and .59 weeks (or by $100 and $116), respectively.
The estimated average impact of the bonus offeJrS was a one percentage-point reduction in the
proportion of claimants who exhausted their VI benefits, but the estimate is not statistically significant
at the 90 percent level The largest impact on exhaustion occurred in response to WT4 (low amount,
long duration), which reduced exhaustion by an estimated 3.2 percentage points. Three other
Washington bonus offers, WTI, WT5, and WT6, reduced exhaustion by more than a single
percentage point, but only the impact for WT5 is significant at the 90 percent confidence level. For

43

the Pennsylvania demonstration, only PT4 appears to have reduced exhaustion, although even that
estimate is not statistically significant at the 90 percent confidence level.
The final column of numbers in Table ill.2 shows that the effects of the bonus offers tended to
be weaker in the initial VI spell than over the full benefit year. For all treatments combined, the
impact on the duration of the initial VI spell was -.39 weeks, which is less than the average bonus
impact on VI weeks in the benefit year (-51 weeks). Among the individual treatments, only PT2 and
WT6 had a greater impact on VI receipt in the initial spell than in the full benefit year. Several
treatments (PT1, WI3, and WT5) had much smaller impacts on VI receipt in the initial spell than
in the full benefit year.
The differential impacts on weeks in the initial spell and impacts on weeks in the benefit year
. are difficult to evaluate. One possibility is that the treatments induced claimants to take more stable
jobs, reducing the probability that treatment group members received additional VI benefits later in
the benefit year. This effect would make the impacts for the benefit year greater than the impacts
for the initial spell, as was the case for 8 of-the 10 bonUs offers, because treatment group members
who took more stable jobs. would be less likely to experience a second VI spell later in the benefit
year. At the very least, the differences between the two sets of estimates imply that treatment group
members did not take temporary jobs in order to hasten reemployment and thus qualify for a
reemployment bonus.
Overall, our findings on VI receipt suggest that the more generous bonus offers generated larger
impacts on VI receipt than did the less generous bonus offers. Based on this finding, we grouped
the treatments and found that the average impact of treatments PT4 and WT6-the most generous
bonus offers-on weeks of VI receipt was significantly greater than the average impact of the other
bonus offers. The estimates demonstrate that the impact of PT4 and WT6, which reduced average
VI receipt by .82 weeks, was about double the impact of the other eight bonus offers, which reduced
average VI receipt by .41 weeks. The difference between the two estimates is statistically significant

44

at the 95 percent confidence level. This difference demonstrates that, on average, limiting the bonus
offer by shortening the qualification period or by reducing the bonus amount significantly limited the
impact of the bonus offer on ill receipt. We investigate this issue in greater detail in the following
section.

c.

IMPACfS OF THE BONUS PARAMETERS ON UI RECEIYf
The design of the Pennsylvania and! Washington demonstrations provides an opportunity to

estimate the impacts of the parameters of the bonus offers on ill receipt.

Using alternative

specifications of the treatment parameters, we can directly analyze the effect of varying the bonus
amount (the "price" effect) and the duration of the bonus offer (the "duration" effect). In this
section, we use two types of models to control for variations in the bonus parameters-one model that
contains a set of indicators to control for the bonus parameters, and one model that contains
continuous variables to control for the bonus parameters.

1.

Indicator-Based Estimates
We derived our initial estimates of the effects of the bonus parameters on ill receipt from a

model that contains three binary variables that define the treatments: one variable that indicates
whether or not the individual received any bonus offer, one variable that indicates whether the
amount of the bonus was expanded beyond the lower levels, and one variable that indicates whether
the duration of the bonus was expanded beyond the lowest levels. As shown in Figure Ill.1, the
expanded-amount offers include treatments PT3 and PT4 in the Pennsylvania demonstration and
treatments WT3 and WT6 in the Washington demonstration.2 The expanded-<1uration offers include
treatments PT2 and PT4 in the PennsyIvania demonstration and Wf4, WTS, and Wf6 in the

20aimants assigned to the medium-amount treatments in Washington (WI'2 and Wf5) were
grouped with the low-amount treatments because they received a bonus offer that, on average, was
only about $110 more than the low-amount offers in Pennsylvania.
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Washington demonstration. These definitions imply that two treatments, PT4 and Wf6, are treated
simultaneously as both an expanded-amount treatment and an expanded-duration treatment.
The estimates based on this specification of the treatments, presented in Table ill.3, demonstrate
that expanding either the amount or the duration of the bonus offer reduced VI receipt. Relative
to the least generous bOnus offers, the average effect of expanding the bonus amount in the two
demonstrations was a reduction in VI receipt of approximately a third of a week, or $65. Both of
these estimates are significant at the 95 percent confidence level. The average·effect of expanding
the duration of the offer relative to the shortest durations was a reduction in VI receipt of a fifth of
a week, or $44. Of these two· estimates, only the impact on dollars of benefits is significant at the
90 percent confidence level. Both expanding the bonus amount and expanding the bonus duration
significantly reduced the duration of the initial UI spell at the 95 percent confidence· level, as shown
in the final column of Table ill.3.
Expanding the bOnus amount had a relatively weak impact on the probability of UI exhaustion,
while expanding the duration had a strong impact on exhaustion. Expanding the bonus amount
reduced VI exhaustion by a relatively small 0.8 percentage points, and the estimate is not significant
at the 90 percent confidence level. In contrast, expanding the bonus duration reduced UI exhaustion
by 1.6 percentage points, and the estimate is significant at the 99 percent confidence level. These
findings suggest that although both the bonus amount and the duration of the bonus were important
determinants of average VI receipt, as discussed earlier, the duration of the bonus was the more
important determinant of the extent to which potential VI exhaustees responded to the bonus offer
by reducing their UI receipt.
Although the model that we used to create Table Ill3 provides more direct estimates of the
price and duration effects than does the simple treatment-based model in the previous section, it is
also more restrictive, because it implies that the treatments within a given amount/duration category
as defined in Figure llI.l generate comparable impacts on UI receipt. The model also implies that
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TABLE III.3
THE ESTIMATED IMPACTS OF EXPANDING THE PARAMETERS OF
THE BONVS OFFERS ON VI RECEIPT
(Standard Errors in Parentheses)

VI Outcome

Weeks of
Benefits
Received in
Benefit Year

Dollars of
Benefits
Received in
Benefit Year

Rate of
Benefit
Exhaustion
(Percent)

Duration of
Initial
VI Spell
(Weeks)

Estimated Impact of Expanding the Amount of the
Bonus Offer

-.35 ••
(.15)

-65··
(25)

(0.6)

-.35 ••
(.15)

Estimated Impact of Expanding the Duration of
the Bonus Offer

-.20
(.15)

-44 •
(24)

-1.6···
(0.6)

(.14)

.(l.8

-.28 ••

NOTE: The estimates are regression-adjusted. The sample includes 27,616 obselVations for whom we have data on both demographic
characteristics and VI receipt. The explanatory variables in the regressions include bonus-parameter indicators, cohort indicators,
office indicators, and demographic and economic variables.
• Statistically significant at the 90 percent confidence level in aJ two-tail test.
•• Statistically significant at the 95 percent confidence level in aJ two-tail test.
••• Statistically significant at the 99 percent confidence level in at two-tail test.
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FIGURE 111.1
CLASSIFICATION OF TREATMENTS BY
BONUS AMOUNT AND DURATION
Pennsylvania Demonstration

Qualification Period

Bonus Amount

12 Weeks

6 Weeks

3 x WBA

6 x WBA

Washington Demonstration

------------,

I
Qualification Peried

Bonus Amount

(.2 x Potential UI

(.4 x Potential UI

Duration) +. 1 Week

Duration) + 1 Week

2 x WBA

4 x WBA

6.

x WBA

I Expanded
Reemploym~nt

Amo~nt

Ex panded Duration

Bonus Demonstration
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the impact of expanding the amount and duration of the bonus offer simultaneously is equal to the
sum of the effect of expanding the amount only and the effect of expanding the duration only. We
tested both of these restrictions and were:: unable to reject either of the restrictions for any of the
four VI outcomes. Hence, because our statistical tests did not deny the validity of the restrictions
placed on the price and duration effects by the model, we conclude that the estimates based on our
grouping of the treatments provide useful information about the effects of the bonus amount and
duration on VI receipt.

2.

Continuous-Model Estimates
An alternative method for estimating the impacts of the bonus parameters on VI receipt is to

estimate the effects of the bonus amount and duration directly. To estimate these effects, we entered
the bonus amount (measured in hundreds of dollars) and the bonus duration (measured in weeks)
into the regression equation. For members of the control group, we set both the bonus amount and
the duration of the bonus equal to zero. By using this continuous model, we estimated a price effect
that can be measured in per-dollar terms and a duration effect that can be measured in per-week
terms.
When we used continuous variables to control directly for the amount and duration of the bonus
offers, both continuous variables had a negative impact on all VI outcomes, as shown in Table IDA.
Not all of the estimates presented in Table. IDA are statistically significant, but both the amount and
the duration had a significantly negative impact on dollars of benefits received. These estimates imply
that, other things being equal, increasing the amount of the bonus offer by $100 would reduce
average VI receipt by about $7 per claimant. The estimated coefficient on duration implies that
extending the duration of the bonus by one week would reduce VI receipt by about $5.50 per
claimant.
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TABLE III.4
TIlE ESTIMATED IMPACI'S OF TIlE CONTINUOUS BONUS
PARAMETERS ON UI RECEIPT
(Standard Errorsin Parentheses)

UIOutcome
Weeks of
Benefits
Received in
Benefit Year

Dollars of
Benefits
Received in
Benefit Year

Amount of Bonus Offer (hundreds of dollars)

-.042 **
(.021)

-7.17 **
(3.47)

·.042
(.085)

-.033
(.020)

Duration of Bonus Offer (weeks)

-.026
(.018)

-5.47 •
(2.90)

-.130 •
(.071)

-.028 •
(.017)

NOTE:

Rate of
Benefit
Exhaustion
(Percent)

Duration of
Initial
UI Spell
(Weeks)

The estimates are regression-adjusted. The sample includes 27,616 observations for whom we have data on both demographic
characteristics and UI receipt. The explanatory variables in the regressions include bonus-parameter variables, cohort
indicators, office indicators, and demographic and economic variables.

• Statistically significant at the 90 percent confidence level in a two-tail test.
percent confidence level in a two-tail test.

** Statistically significant at the 95

Reemployment Bonus Demonstrations

50

Again, variations in the bonus amount appear to have had a relatively weak: effect on whether

individuals exhausted their benefits relative to the effect of the bonus duration on the same outcome.
The estimated impact of increasing the bonus amount by $100 was less than one-third of the
estimated impact of increasing the duration of the bonus by one week. In addition, the magnitude
of the estimated coefficient on the bonus amount was less than half that of the corresponding
standard error, and thus the estimate does not approach statistical significance at the 90 percent
confidence level. In contrast, the estimated coefficient on duration is significant at the 90 percent
confidence level.
In Table rn.s we use the estimates presented in Table rnA to calculate predicted bonus receipt

rates for four hypothetical bonus offers. These hypothetical bonus offers match the constant-amount,
constant-duration offers for which we estimated predicted bonus receipt rates in Chapter II. The
hypothetical bonus offers were chosen so as to enc.ompass the majority of policy-relevant bonus
options. The predicted impacts on VI receipt were calculated according to the amount and duration
of the hypothetical offer and the estimated coefficients on amount and duration presented in Table

rnA.
Given our continuous-model estimates for price and duration effects, all of the hypothetical
bonus offers considered in Table

m.s would reduce VI receipt.

The least generous hypothetical

bonus offer-$SOO for a 6-week qualification period-would reduce VI receipt by just over a third of
a week, or by $69. The impact on weeks in the initial VI spell is similar to the impact on benefit
weeks in the benefit year. All of these estimates are significant at the 99 percent confidence level.
The least generous bonus would also significantly reduce the probability of VI exhaustion, by one
percentage point.
As expected, the impacts of the hypothetical bonus offers on VI receipt increase as the bonus

amount or the duration of the bonus increases. For example, because we specified in our model a

Sl

TABLE III.5
THE PREDICTED IMPACTS OF FOUR HYPOTHETICAL BONUS OFFERS
ON VI RECEIPT, BASED ON THE CONTINUOUS MODELS
(Standard Errors of Predicted Impacts in Parentheses)

UIOutcome

Amount of
Bonus Offer

Duration of
Bonus
Qualification
Period

Weeks of
Benefits
Received in
Benefit Year

Dollars of
Benefits
Received in
Benefit Year

Rate of Benefit
Exhaustion
(Percent)

Duration of
Initial VI Spell
(Weeks)

$500

6 Weeks

-.37 ***
(.09)

-69 ***
(15)

-1.0 ***
(0.4)

-.33 ***
(.09)

2

$500

12 Weeks

-.52 ***
(.17)

-101 ***
(28)

-1.8 ***
(0.7)

-.50 ***
(.16)

3

$1,000

6 Weeks

-.58 ***
(.17)

-105 ***
(27)

-1.2 *
(0.7)

-.50 ***
(.16)

4

$1,000

12 Weeks

-.73 ***
(.18)

-137 ***
(30)

-2.0 ***
(0.7)

-.67 ***
(.18)

Hypothetical
Bonus Offer

NOTE: Predicted impacts are based on the regression-adjusted impact estimates presented in Table III.5.

* Statistically significant at the 90 percent confidence level in a two-tail test.

** Statistically significant at the 95 percent confidence level in a two-tail test.
** * Statistically significant at the 99 percent confidence level in a two-tail test.
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linear relationship between the bonus parameters and VI receipt, doubling the bonus amount and
duration simply doubles the impact of the bonus offer on VI receipt As shown in Table m.5, the
most generous bonus offer-$l,OOO for a 12-week qualification period-has twice the impact of the
$500, 6-week bonus offer, reducing VI receipt by .73 weeks, or by $137. Hypothetical bonus offers
2 and 3, which combine a low amount with a long duration or a high amount with a short duration,
would reduce VI receipt by a greater amount than the least generous offer but less than the most
generous offer.
D. THE IMPACfS ON

m RECElYf AMONG POPULATION SUBGROUPS

The impacts of a reemployment bonus program on subgroups should be examined for at least
two reasons.

One is to provide information to policymakers who may consider targeting a

reemployment bonus program specifically to select groups of claimant, such as older workers. The
other is to be aware of whether treatments benefit some claimants more effectively than others-for
example, a program that benefits only one gender or certain racial groups may not be considered
good policy even if the overall program is cost-effective.
In this section, we examine estimates of the impacts of the bonus treatments from two distinct

yet complementary perspectives. The first set of estimates pertains to each subgroup separately. We
calculated these estimates by partitioning the sample into subgroups, and then estimating the impacts
of the treatments using a set of characteristic variables to control for differences among claimants
within the subgroup. The second set of estimates are derived for each claimant subgroup, controlling
for differences in characteristics among claimants, both within each subgroup and between subgroups.
These estimates are the marginal treatment impacts for the subgroups, which can be used to compare
impacts across the subgroups, holding other factors that might affect the treatment constant.
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Both sets of estimates are useful for policy purposes.3 The first perspective provides estimates
of the outcomes for a particular group of claimants (for example, the effect of the treatments on
older claimants). The second perspective provides an estimate of the marginal treatment effect for
a particular group (for example, the effect of the treatment on older claimants, holding constant other
factors that may also affect the treatment). The first set of estimates should guide policy when the
characteristics for subgroups are not expected to vary significantly over time or by location; for
example, if older claimants are expected to remain more educated and more likely to be male over
time and by location. IT, on the other hand, the characteristics of subgroups are expected to vary over
time or by location, the second set of estimates can help direct policy. The second set of estimates
also provides information on the factors that, other things being equal, are the most important
>

determinants of how claimants respond to bonus offers.
Table llI.6 presents the impacts of the treatments on weeks and dollars of VI receipt in the
benefit year for subgroups defined by the following characteristics: gender, age, race, industry, and
area unemployment rate. These estimates combine all of the treatment groups in Pennsylvania and
Washington into a single combined treatment group, yielding a single overall estimate of the
treatment inlpact for each subgroup.
The subgroup analysis of impacts by gender, age, and race revealed no significant differences
across subgroups for each characteristic. Only a few of the estimated impacts among these subgroups
are statistically significant, and all these significant estimates measure about a one-halfweekreduction
in VI receipt under either estimation perspective. For example, the data yielded estimates .of.the
treatment impacts for young, middle-age, and older claimants of about a one-half week reduction in

ill receipt under either estimation perspective.

3Estimates controlling for variations in the characteristics of claimants within the subgroup are
the type presented in the Washington final report. Estimates controlling for variations in the
characteristics of claimants within and between the subgroups are presented in the Pennsylvania final
report.
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TABLE III.6
THE AVERAGE IMPACTS OF THE TREATMENTS ON VI RECEIPT BY SUBGROUP

Marginal
Impacts for Subgroup

Impacts for Subgroup
Weeks of
Benefits
Received in
Benefit Year

Dollars of
Benefits
Received in
Benefit Year

Male

-0.49 ••

-93 ••

-0.48 ••

-88 ••

16,708

Female

-0.53 ••

-66 •

-0.47 •

-59

10,908

Younger than 35 Years

-0.59 ..

-75 ••

-0.53 ..

-69

10,490

Ages 35 to 54 Years

-0.40 •

-85 ••

-0.40

-82 •

14,754

55 Years or Older

-0.47

-92

-0.48

-97

White

-0.45 ••

-85 ..

-0.42 ••

-74 ..

Black

-0.80

-62

-0.81

-94

2,107

Hispanic

-0.46

-39

-0.40

-60

1,472

Other Nonwhite

-1.37

-141

-1.17

-137

834

Nonmanufacturing

-0.27

-0.25

-44

21,100

Durable Manufacturing

-0.93 ..

-155 ..

-0.95 ••

-155 ••

3,906

Nondurable Manufacturing

-1.74 ..1#

-241 ..1#

-1.55 .. 11

-214 .. 11

2,710

Low Unemployment Rate

-0.89 ••

-165 ••

-0.71 •

-151 ••

10,360

Moderate Unemployment Rate

-0.191#

-381#

61#

10,048

High Unemployment Rate

-0.54

-40

-84 .1#

7,208

Subgroup

-52 •

Weeks of
Benefits
Received in
Benefit Year

-0.17

#

-0.57 .1#

Dollars of
Benefits
Received in
Benefit Year

Sample
Size

2,372
23,203

NOTE: The regression equation also included interactions of the treatment indicators and the indicators for quarter of enrollment, and
noninteracted regressors to control for base period earnings, UI weekly benefit amount, potential benefit duration, recall status,
and union-hiring status.
• Statistically significant at the 90 percent confidence level in a two-tail test.
•• Statistically significant at the 95 percent confidence level in a two-tail test.

I The treatment impact is significantly different from the subgroup excluded in the category at the 90 percent confidence level in a two-

tail test. For each characteristic the excluded subgroup is the first one listed.
1# The treatment impact is significantly different from the subgroup excluded in the category at the 95 percent confidence level in a twotail test. For each characteristic the excluded subgroup is the first one listed.
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Whites were the only racial subgroup to exhibit a statistically significant response to the bonus
offer, with an average reduction in ill receipt of one-half week. However, the estimated reduction
in weeks of ill receipt among the other racial subgroups were as large or larger than the impact
among whites. The reduction in ill weeks among Hispanics was roughly equal to that among

.

whites. 4 The reduction in ill weeks among blacks was nearly double that among whites, while the
response by the other nonwhite racial group (which includes Asians, native Americans, and Pacific
Islanders) was nearly triple that among whites. But due to the small size of the Hispanic, blac~ and
other nonwhite racial subgroups, none of the estimated impacts for these groups differs significantly
from zero or from the impact for whites.
A significant difference in the effects of the treatments by industry of previous employment was
obselVed, with the strongest response for manufacturing.5 Reductions in ill dollars and weeks were
significantly greater for claimants whose previous job was in nondurable manufacturing than for
claimants from outside manufacturing. As shown in Table ID.6, the estimated reduction in ill receipt
for treatment group claimants from nondurable manufacturing was -1.7 weeks, and the marginal
impact estimate was slightly smaller (-1.6 weeks). On average, the bonus offers reduced ill receipt
among claimants from durable manufacturing by nearly a

wee~

while the bonus offers reduced ill

receipt among claimants from outside manufacturing by about one-quarter of a week. H it is true that
most dislocated workers were previously employed in manufacturing, then these results are consistent

~e notable distinction in the impact estimates for racial subgroups in the Pennsylvania and
Washington final reports was for Hispanics.' In Pennsylvania, the marginal treatment impact for
Hispanics was +031 weeks; in Washington, the treatment impact on Hispanics was -1.25. Of the
1,472 Hispanics in the merged sample, only 436 were from Pennsylvania; thus, the Washington
treatment impact dominates.

5We formed the industry subgroups according to the two-digit Standard Industrial Oassification
codes as follows: nonmanufacturing: 01-19 and 40-99; durable manufacturing: 24-25 and 32-38; and
nondurable manufacturing: 20-23,26-29,30-31, and 39.
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with the relatively strong results for dislocated workers presented in the Washington final report.

6

The greater reduction in weeks of VI receipt for claimants from nondurable as opposed to durable
manufacturing may reflect the relative flexIbility and adaptability of workers from nondurable
manufacturing.
Perhaps the most striking result in the subgroup analysis pertains to the differential response
according to the local unemployment rate. To investigate this variation in the estimated impacts, we
combined the Pennsylvania and Washington enrollment sites into low-, moderate-, and highunemployment rate areas based on the local total unemployment rate. 7
Our estimates based on this grouping demonstrate that the treatment-induced reduction in VI
receipt in moderate- and high-unemployment rate areas was significantly smaller than the reduction
in the low-unemployment areas. This result is consistent with the view that a reemployment bonus
is most effective when reemployment opportunities are relatively abundant, as reflected by low local
unemployment rates. While the two methodologies yield somewhat different estimates of the impact
on dollars of VI receipt among these subgroups, they yield nearly identical results for weeks of VI
receipt. 8

6A

complete subgroup analysis of dislocated workers was not possible with the merged data, since
dislocation in Washington was defined according to patterns of retrospective earnings, and these data
were not available for claimants enrolled in the Pennsylvania demonstration.
7Based on our grouping, the 9 low-unemployment (under 5 percent) sites were the Pennsylvania
sites Butler, Coatesville, Lancaster, McKeesport, and Reading, and the Washington sites Bellevue,
Lynnwood, North Seattle, and Renton. The 15 moderate-unemployment (5 to 7 percent) sites were
the Pennsylvania sites Erie, Lewiston, Philadelphia-North, Philadelphia-Uptown, Pittston, and
Scranton, and the Washington sites Auburn, Bellingham, Bremerton, Everett, Mount Vernon,
Olympia, Rainier, Spokane, and Walla Walla. The 9 high-unemployment (over 7 percent) sites were
the Pennsylvania site Connelsville, and the Washington sites Aberdeen, Cowlitz County, Lewis
County, Moses Lake, Sunnyside, Tri-cities, Wenatchie, and Yakima
lYro examine the impact of the bonus treatments by quarter of enrollment, we also combined the
Pennsylvania and Washington claimants into groups by calendar quarter after the start of the
demonstrations. The largest treatment impact, an average reduction of more than 1.5 weeks,
occurred among claimants enrolled in the first quarter of the demonstrations. The impact on dollars
of compensation was significantly smaller for claimants enrolled in every subsequent quarter. This
result for the pooled sample is similar to that in the Pennsylvania and Washington final reports, and
the cause is not obvious.
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IV. IMPACfS ON EMPLOYMENT AND EARNINGS

Because the bonus offers significantly reduced VI receipt, as demonstrated in Chapter ill, we
also expected to observe an increase in employment and earnings. Given that bonuses were paid only
to claimants who found reemployment, the bonus offers must have reduced VI receipt because they
induced claimants to become reemployed more rapidly. If claimants who received bonus offers
became reemployed more quickly, they should also have experienced greater levels of employment
and earnings following their benefit application.

In this chapter, we examine employment and

earnings during the year following claimants' benefit application to determine whether this impact
occurred.
Our estimates provide only weak: evidence that any of the reemployment bonus offers increased
the postapplication employment and earnings of claimants assigned to the treatments. On average,
the bonus offers did not increase either employment or earnings significantly. During the year
following benefit application, treatment group members received an average of only $7 more in
earnings than control group members. In terms of individual treatments, the earnings impacts were
more positive for the high-amount, long-duration bonus offers than for the less generous bonus
offers, although the impact estimates even for the most generous bonus offers are not statistically
significant. Additional estimates based on the parameters of the bonus offers suggest that the
amount, but not the duration, of the bonus offer significantly affected earnings.

A.

DATA AND METHODOWGY
Our analysis of the impacts of the bonus offers on employment and earnings was based on two

quarterly measures drawn from the VI wage records: (1) whether claimants were employed, and (2)
the earnings of claimants. For the Pennsylvania claimants, the employment indicator was whether
a claimant was reported as having positive weeks of work in the quarter. For the Washington
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date (Corson et aL, 1989; and Corson and Decker, 1990). In our analysis, we attempt to address this
shortcoming by presenting estimates for the quarter in which claimants applied for benefits, which
encompasses the period immediately after the benefit application date.
Another shortcoming is that a variety of factors may have affected the accuracy of the wage
records data. For example, the wage records exclude the earnings of claimants who were employed
outside the state or were employed outside the UI-covered sector (for example, those who were selfemployed). Because our analysis of employment and earnings would include such individuals as if
their employment and earnings were zero, the impact estimates would be biased toward zero.
Further, the wage records report earnings when they are received, not when they are earned.
Claimants may have received severance payor pension pay-outs from their pre-UI employer after
they applied for benefits. These payments would be misinterpreted as earnings from a post-UI job,
overstating the earnings received by claimants following their benefit application date. l
We attempted to minimize the effect of these shortcomings of the wage records data by
excluding claimant observations whose earnings were greater than $100,000 in any quarter of
observation. This rule excluded 67 observations from our analysis sample of 27,616 claimants, and
all but one of the excluded claimants were from the Washington demonstration.

B.

THE IMPACfS OF INDIVIDUAL TREATMENTS ON EMPLOYMENT AND EARNINGS
In the absence of a reemployment bonus, the control group claimants in Washington received

greater earnings after benefit application than did the control group claimants in Pennsylvania Table
IV.1 shows that, during the four-quarter period of observation, Washington control group members
received an average of about $12,000, while Pennsylvania control group members received only $9,300
over the comparable period.

lDecker (1989) and Corson et al. (1991) discuss these and related shortcomings of UI wage
records data.
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TABLEN.l
MEAN EARNINGS, BY 1REATMENT GROUP
(Dollars)

Period of ObseIVation a

Treatment Group

Quarter of'
Benefit
Application

Quarter
1

Quarter
2

Quarter
3

Total

Sample
Size

PeonsyMmia DemousIration

Groups
Control Group

2,649

1,698

2,351

2,605

9,303

3,354

PTl

2,598

1,735

2,289

2,434

9,055

1,385

PT2

2,863

1,840

2,388

2,658

9,749

2,427

PT3

2,662

1,833

2,378

2,702

9,575

1,885

PT4

2,673

1,790

2,517

2,725

9,705

3,030

Control Group

3,058

2,581

3,121

3,270

12,030

3,063

Wfl

3,066

2,381

3,049

3,269

11,765

2,236

Wf2

3,084

2,536

3,009

3,408

12,036

2,340

Wf3

3,038

2,622

3,100

3,455

12,216

1,576

Wf4

3,056

2,654

3,038

3,326

12,074

2,373

Wf5

3,049

2,532

3,083

3,332

11,996

2,349

Wf6

3,048

2,759

3,384

3,568

12,758

1,531

WasbiDgtoo Demonstration
Groups

NOTE: The sample means presented in this table are not regression-adjusted. The fuJI sample includes 27,549 obseIVations for whom
we have data on both demographic characteristics and employment and earnings. We excluded obseIVations with earnings greater
than $100,000 in any quarter.
aQuarters I, 2, and 3 are the first, second, and third full calendar quarters after benefit application.
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Two factors explain the differential earnings of the control groups in the two demonstrations.
First, on average, the Washington claimants were more highly paid than the Pennsylvania claimants
before their respective layoffs, as shown in Table 1.3 in Chapter 1. We would expect that this
difference in earnings would remain as claimants in both states became reemployed.

Second,

Washington claimants appear to have be.come reemployed more quickly than the Pennsylvania

\

claimants. As shown in Table IV.2, the rate of employment for the three quarters following benefit
application was higher for Washington claim~ts than for Pennsylvania claimants.2

Since

unemployed claimants received zero earnings, the relatively low employment rates for the
Pennsylvania claimants contnbutes to the relatively low earnings levels experienced by these
claimants.
Our regression-adjusted estimates of the impacts of the treatments on employment provide no
evidence that individual bonus offers enhanced the employment of claimants. As shown in Table
IV.3, more than half of the estimated impacts of individual treatments on the quarterly probability
of employment had a negative sign. Only 4 of the 40 estimattd quarterly impacts are statistically
significant at the 95 percent confidence level, and only 1 of the$e 4 significant estimates is positive.
The combined impacts of the treatments show that treatment group members had a slightly lower
probability of employment in each of the quarters than did control group members, although none
of these quarterly differences is significant3

Zne higher reemployment rates for Washington were due partly to the inclusion of stand-by
recall claimants in the Washington demonstration. Since these claimants expected to be recalled to
their pre-VI employer after a brief period of unemployment, the inclusion of these claimants in the
Washington demonstration increased the overall employment rates for.Washington claimants relative
to the Pennsylvania demonstration, which excluded stand-by recall claimants.
3Despite the lack of significant impacts on the probability of employment, the bonus offers may
still have increased employment by increasing the length of employment within the quarters without
changing the probability of any employment in the quarters. Since we were unable to construct this
type of quarterly employment measure for Washington claimants, we did not investigate this issue.
However, for the Pennsylvania demonstration, Corson et ale (1991) reported that none of the bonus
offers significantly increased weeks of employment in any of the postapplication quarters.
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TABLE IV.2
MEAN EMPLOYMENT RATES, BY lREATMENT GROUP
(Percent)

Period of Obsel'Vlltiona
Quarter of
Benefit
Application

Quarter
1

Quarter

2

Quarter
3

Sample
Sizeb

Control Group

84.1

59.0

67.3

70.6

3,353

PTl

82.4

57.0

66.5

67.7

1,385

PT2

84.3

60.5

67.0

68.6

2,428

PTI

84.5

59.6

67.1

713

1,885

PT4

83.9

602

68.5

70.8

3,030

Control Group

81.7

65.9

70.5

72.0

3,082

Wf1

80.3

643

67.8

71.4

2,246

Wf2

80.7

63.4

69.0

71.3

2,348

Wf3

8004

64.1

71.8

74.0

1,583

WT4

80.4

64.5

69.2

70.8

2,387

WT5

80.6

642

69.0

71.6

2,353

WT6

81.3

67.4

71.6

73.1

1,535

Treatment Group

Pennsylvania Demonstration

Groupo

Wasbington Demonstration
Groups

NOTE: The sample means presented in this table are not regression-adjusted. The full sample includes 27,616 obsel'Vlltions for whom
we have data on both demographic characteristics and employment.
aQuarters 1, 2, and 3 are the first, second, and thir": full calendar quarters after benefit application.
bDue to missing data, the sample sizes for the Pennsylvania groups vaI)' slightly according to the period of observation.
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TABLE IV.3
THE ESTIMATED IMPACTS OF THE TREATMENTS ON THE PROBABILITY OF EMPLOYMENT
(Standard Errors in Parentheses)
(Percent)
Period of ObseIVation a
Quarter of
Benefit Applicaton

Treatment

Quarter
1

Quarter
2

Quarter
3

Pennsylvania Treatments
PTl

-0.9
(1.2)

-1.7
(1.5)

-0.8
(1.5)

-2.9 ..
(104)

PT2

0.0
(1.0)

1.1
(1.3)

-0.5
(1.2)

-2.2 •
(1.2)

PT3

0.3
(Ll)

0.5
(104)

-004
(1.3)

0.6
(1.3)

-0.8
(1.0)

0.5
(1.2)

-0.1
(Ll)

-0.8
(1.1)

WTl

-1.1
(1.0)

-1.1
(1.3)

-2.5 •
(1.3)

-0.4
(1.2)

Wf2

-0.9
(1.0)

-1.9
(1.3)

-1.2
(1.2)

-0.5
(1.2)

Wf3

-0.9
(1.2)

-1.0
(1.5)

1.7
(1.4)

2.5 •
(1.4)

WT4

-1.0
(1.0)

-0.8
(1.3)

-0.9
(1.2)

-1.0
(1.2)

WT5

-0.7
(1.0)

-0.6
(1.3)

-0.9
(1.2)

0.1
(1.2)

WT6

-0.6
(1.2)

1.5
(1.5)

0.9
(104)

1.0
(104)

Combined Treatments

-0.6
(0.5)

-0.2
(0.7)

-0.5
(0.7)

-0.6
(0.6)

Combined Control Group Mean

83.0

62.3

68.8

71.3

PT4

Washington Treatments

NOTE:

The sample includes approximately 27,610 obseIVations for whom we have data on both demographic characteristics and
employment. Due to missing data on employment, the sample sizes vary slightly according to the period of obseIVation. The
explanatory variables in the regressions include treatment indicators, cohort indicators, office indicators, and demographic and
economic variables.

aQuarters 1, 2, and 3 are the first, second, and third full calendar quarters after benefit applicaton.
·Statistically significant at the 90 percent confidence level in a two-tail test.
"Statistically significant at the 95 percent confidence level in a two-tail test.

Reemployment Bonus Demonstrations

65

Similarly, the treatments appear not to have increased the earnings of claimants significantly.
Over the entire period of observation, treatment group members in the two demonstrations received
an average of only $7 more in earnings than did control group members, as shown in the bottom
right-hand comer of Table IVA. The estimated impacts of individual treatments on earnings were
generally modest, both in each quarter and over the entire observation period, and many of these
estimated impacts were negative rather than positive. The impacts of the most generous bonus offers
on earnings were more positive than the impacts of the less generous offers, but the estimated
impacts for even the most generous bonus offers were not significantly greater than zero. 4
The lack of consistently positive impacts of the treatments on employment and earnings is
somewhat surprising given the apparent treatment-induced reductions in VI receipt that were
discussed in the previous chapter. However, the estimates of the impacts on employment and

earnings are, for the most part, statistically insignificant. This statistical insignificance does not show
that the treatments had no positive impact on employment and earnings, rather it simply implies that
we have no evidence that such impacts occurred. The statistical insignificance of the estimates is at

least partly attnbutable to the large standard errors of the estimates. Even a substantial positive
impact on earnings, such as the $300 increase in earnings that we estimated for Wf6, does not differ
significantly from zero given the large standard errors associated with our estimates. This finding also
implies that we should not place too much emphasis on the negative point estimates contained in
Tables IV.3 and IV.4.

4We also analyzed the impacts of the treatments on total earnings by population subgroup, using
the same methodology as we used to evaluate VI impacts by subgroup in Chapter ID. The only
significant treatment impact on earnings occurred for claimants whose previous job was in nondurable
manufacturing. Earnings for this group were estimated be have increased by an average of $880 per
claimant in response to the combined treatments. The impact for these claimants from nondurable
manufacturing industries was also significantly different from the $142 reduction estimated for
claimants from outside manufacturing. Earnings for workers from durable manufacturing were
estimated to have increased by $300 in response to the treatments, but this impact is not statistically
significant. These results are consistent with the estimates of the treatment impacts on UI receipt
by industry that were reported in Chapter ID.
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TABLE IVA
TIlE ESTIMATED IMPACTS OF TIlE TREATMENTS ON EARNINGS
(Standard Errors in Parentheses)
(Dollars)

Period of ObselVationa
Quarter of
Benefit Applicaton

Treatment

Quarter
1

Quarter
2

Quarter
3

Total

Pennsylvania Treatments

PT1

-20
(103)

19
(98)

-89
(96)

-199 **
(97)

-289
(272)

PT2

117
(86)

87
(81)

-25
(80)

-14
(81)

165
(226)

PTI

-19
(92)

116
(88)

-11
(86)

56
(87)

141
(244)

PT4

-32
(81)

70
(77)

81
(75)

53
(76)

171
(214)

11
(89)

-178 **
(85)

-60
(83)

1
(84)

-226
(236)

(88)

-54
(84)

-143 •
(82)

100
(83)

-134
(232)

Wf3

-24
(100)

63
(94)

-19
(93)

176·
(94)

196
(262)

WT4

-74
(88)

36
(83)

-138 •
(82)

-9
(83)

-186
(232)

WT5

-98
(88)

-42
(83)

-70
(82)

24
(83)

-186
(232)

WT6

-134
(101)

102
(95)

143
(94)

189··
(95)

300
(265)

-22
(46)

26
(44)

-29
(43)

31
(43)

7
(121)

Washington Treatments

WT1
WT2

-36

Combined Treatments

Combined Control Group Mean
NOTE:

$2,844

$2,119

$2,719

$2,922

$10,605

The sample includes 27,549 obselVations for whom we have data on both demographic characteristics and earnings. We
excluded obselVations with earnings greater than $100,000 in any quarter. The explanatory variables in the regressions include
treatment indicators, office indicators, and demographic and economic variables.

aQuarters 1, 2, and 3 are the first, second, and third full calendar quarters after benefit applicaton.
·Statistically significant at the 90 percent confidence level in a two-tail test.
• ·Statistically significant at the 95 percent confidence level in a two-tail test.
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C. IMPACfS OF THE BONUS PARAMETERS ON EARNINGS
Although the individual treatments appear not to have had a significant impact on earnings, our
finding that the more generous offers were more likely to increase earnings suggest that we may be
able to detect a significant relationship between the bonus parameters and earnings. Using the same
specifications of the treatment parameters as we used to evaluate the impacts on UI receipt in
Chapter ill, we can analyze the effects of varying the amount (the price effect) and the duration (the
duration effect) of the bonus offer on earnings. We again use two types of models to control for
variations in the bonus parameters-one model in which indicators are used to control for the bonus
parameters, and one model in which continuous variables are used to control for the bonus
parameters.
The model used in our indicator-based estimates of the price and duration effects on earnings

was equivalent to the model used to estimate the price and duration effects on VI receipt in Chapter
ill (see Table ill3). The estimates based on this specification of the treatments, which are presented
in Table IV5, demonstrate that expanding the bonus amount significantly increased earnings receipt
during the postapplication period.

Relative to the least generous bonus offers, the effect of

expanding the bonus amount in the two demonstrations was an increase in earnings of $307 during
the entire postapplication period.

This estimated impact of expanding the bonus amount was

significant at the 95 percent confidence level The estimated impacts on earnings in· individual
quarters 1, 2, and 3 are also significant at the 95 percent confidence level. Relative to the effect of
expanding the bonus amount, expanding the bonus duration had a small impact on earnings, and the
estimate is not statistically significant.
When we used continuous variables to control directly for the amount and duration of the bonus
offers, again only the amount of the bonus offer had a significantly positive impact on earnings. The
estimates presented in Table IV.6 imply that, other things being equal, a $100 increase in the amount
of the bonus offer would increase average earnings by $28 during the four quarters of observation.
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TABLE IV.5
ESTIMATED IMPACTS OF EXPANDING
TIlE PARAMETERS OF IHE BONUS OFFERS ON EARNINGS
(Standard Errors in Parentheses)
(Dollars)

Period of Observationa
Quarter of
Benefit
Application

Quarter 1

Quarter 2

Estimated Impact of Expanding the
Amount of the Bonus Offer

-53
(48)

92 **
(45)

133
(44)

Estimated Impact of Expanding the
Duration of the Bonus Offer

-27
(45)

61
(43)

56
(42)

NOTE:

**.

Quarter 3
135
(45)
9
(42)

**.

Total

307··
(125)
99
(ll8)

Estimates are regression-adjusted. The sample includes 27,549 observations for whom we have data on both demographic
characteristics and earnings. We excluded observations with earnings greater than $100,000 in any quarter. The explanatory
variables in the regressions include bonus-parameter indicators, cohort indicators, office indicators, and demographic and
economic variables.

aQuarters 1,2, and 3 are the first, second, and third full calendar quarters after benefit application.
"Statistically significant at the 95 percent confidence level in a two-tail test.
**·Statistically significant at the 99 percent confidence level in a two-tail test.
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TABLE IV.6
ESTIMATED IMPACI'S OF TIlE BONUS PARAMETERS
ON EARNINGS IN A CONTINUOUS MODEL
(Standard Errors in Parentheses)
(Dollars)

Period of Observationa
Quarter of
Benefit
Application
Amount of Bonus Offer
(hundreds of dollars)
Duration of Bonus Offer (weeks)

NOTE:

Quarter 1

Quarter 2

Quarter 3

Total

(6.48)

8.89
(6.14)

6.50
(6.04)

17.97 ...
(6.11)

28.38 •
(17.10)

-1.30
(5.41)

-0.38
(5.13)

-2.78
(5.04)

-6.65
(5.10)

-11.12
(14.27)

-4.98

Estimates are regression-adjusted. The sample includes 27,549 observations for whom we have data on both demographic
characteristics and earnings. We excluded observations with earnings greater than $100,000 in any quarter. The explanatory
variables in the regressions include bonus-parameter variables, cohort indicators, office indicators, and demographic and
economic variables.

aQuarters 1, 2, and 3 are the first, second, and third full calendar quarters after benefit application.
·Statistically significant at the 90 percent confidence level in a two-tail test.
•• ·Statistically significant at the 99 percent confidence level in a two-tail test.
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Following the quarter of benefit application, each of the quarterly estimates of the effect of the bonus
amount was positive, but only the effect in quarter 3 is statistically significant.

In Table IV.7 we present the predicted impacts of four hypothetical bonus offers on earnings
receipt based on the estimated price and duration effects presented in Table IV.6. The hypothetical
bonus offers in Table IV.7 match the hypothetical bonus offers discussed in Chapters IT and ill.
As expected, the impacts of the hypothetical bonus offers on earnings increase as the amount
of t~e offers increases, and the impacts decrt:ase as the duration increases. However, none of the
estimates differs significantly from zero at the 90 percent confidence level. The least generous
hypothetical bonus offer-$500 for a 6-week: qualification period-would increase earnings by an
estimated $75, but this predicted impact is not statistically significant. Due to the linear model, the
predicted impact of the $1,000, 12-week bonus offer is equal to twice the impact of the least generous
bonus offer at $149, but this predicted impact: is also not statistically significant. The largest impact
on earnings occurs for hypothetical bonus offer 3, which offers $1,000 for 6 weeks. This high-amount,
short-duration offer would increase earnings by an estimated $217.
The statistical insignificance of the predicted impacts of the hypothetical bonus offers on earnings
is not surprising given that none of the actual treatments tested in Pennsylvania or Washington were
found to have a statistically significant impact on earnings. Despite this statistical insignificance, the
magnitudes of the predicted impacts are consistent with the estimated impacts on UI receipt
presented in Chapter ill. However, the large standard errors of the predictions make it impossible
to detect a relatively modest impact on earnings.
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TABLEIV.7
PREDICTED IMPAcrs OF FOUR HYPOTIIETICAL
BONUS OFFERS ON EARNINGS, BASED ON
TIIECONTINUOUSMODE~

(Standard Errors of Predicted Impacts in Parentheses)

Hypothetical Bonus
Offer

Duration of Bonus
Qualification Period

Amount of
Bonus Offer

Predicted Impact on
Earnings (Dollars)

1

$500

6 Weeks

75
(75)

2

$500

12 Weeks

8
(136)

3

$1,000

6 Weeks

217
(136)

4

$1,000

12 Weeks

150
(149)

NOTE: Predicted impacts are based on the regression-adjusted impact estimates presented in Table
IV.6. The impacts are based on total earnings received during the quarter of benefit
application and the three subsequent quarters.
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V. CONCLUSION

In 1988 and 1989, demonstrations of reemployment bonus offers to unemployment insurance

(UI) program applicants were conducted in Pennsylvania and Washington. These two field tests of
a UI bonus differed somewhat according to claimant eligIoility conditions and the terms of the bonus
offers, but these differences were superseded by similarities that allowed us to merge the sample of
claimants in the separate demonstrations. This report presented our analysis of a merged sample of
27,616 claimants who were found to be eligIole for the demonstrations.

A.

SUMMARY OF RESPONSES TO THE BONUS OFFERS
Qaimants who were assigned to one of the demonstration treatments were told that they would

receive a specific lump-sum cash payment if they started a new job by a certain date and remained
on that job for a specified minimum period (16 weeks in Pennsylvania, and 4 months in Washington).

In both demonstrations, the bonus qualification period was either short (3 weeks in Pennsylvania, and
an average of 5.7 weeks in Washington) or long (12 weeks in Pennsylvania, and an average of 11
weeks in Washington), and the bonus amount was calculated as a multiple of each claimant's weekly
benefit amount (WBA). Pennsylvania tested low and high multiples (three times and six times) of
the WBA, while Washington tested three multiples (two, four, and six times) of the WBA To
examine the behavior of claimants based on the merged sample, we compared the combined control
group with the various treatment groups to measure several effects: the effect of each treatment
separately, the effect of all treatments combined, the effect of increasing the dollar bonus amount
(the price effect), and the effect of increasing the duration of the bonus offer (the duration effect).1

1We estimated the price effect and the duration effect in two different ways. First, we estimated
the effects as a response to a discrete increase in the cash bonus amount and the bonus qualification
period. Second, we estimated the effects in a model in which the dollar bonus offer and the weeks
in the qualification period were measured continuously.
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In our analysis, we examined participation in the experiment and various aspects of response to

the bonus offer. The principal measure of participation that we studied was the proportion of
claimants who received a bonus after becoming reemployed within their qualification, period. The
degree of response to a bonus offer was measured by the impact of the offer on UI receipt,
employment, and earnings of treatment group members.
Overall, about 13 percent of the claimants assigned to a treatment in either demonstration
returned to work within the bonus qualification period and received a bonus. Among the individual
treatments, the rate of bonus receipt ranged from 7 percentfor the low-amount, short-duration bonus
offer in Pennsylvania to 22 percent for the high-amount, long-duration bonus offer in Washington.
Our estimates based on continuous measures of the amount and the duration of the bonus showed
. that both of these (ijrnensions of the bonus offer significantly affected the probability of bonus
receipt. The estimates imply that increasing the bonus amount by $100 would increase the probability
of bonus receipt by 0.8 percentage points, and increasing the duration of the bonus by one week
would increase the probability of bonus

r~ipt

by 0.9 percentage points. The probability of bonus

receipt appears to have been greater in Washington than in Pennsylvania for similar treatments. This
finding suggests that bonus receipt, while (affected by the amount and duration of the bonus offer,
is also sensitive to different program characteristics and different operating environments.
The bonus offers tested in the demonstrations significantly reduced VI receipt during the benefit
year. Among the individual treatments, the impacts on UI receipt ranged from a negligIble increase
of $24 for the low-amount, short-duration bonus offer in Washington to a $146 reduction for the
high-amount, long-duration offer in Washington. The combined average impact of the treatments
.

.

was a reduction in VI receipt of $85 per clain;1ant. Estimates based on the continuous measures of
the bonus amount and the duration of the bonus suggest that both of these dimensions significantly
affected the amount of VI benefits received. The estimates imply that increasing the bonus amount
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by $100 would reduce average VI receipt by about $7 per claimant, while increasing the bonus
duration by one week would reduce average VI receipt by about $5.50 per claimant.
We also found that the impacts of the bonus offers on VI receipt were largest among claimants
who were previously employed in manufactwing industries and among claimants from areas whose
unemployment rates were relatively low. The: impacts of the treatments on VI receipt did not vary
significantly according to gender, age, or race.
Because the bonus offers reduced VI receipt, we also expected to observe an increase in
employment and earnings among claimants assigned to the treatments, but we found no clear
evidence ofsuch an increase. On average, the employment and earnings of treatment group members
were nearly the same as for the control group. During the year after benefit application, treatment
group members earned an average of only $7 more than control group members. However, the
impacts of the most generous bonus offers were more positive than\the impacts of the less generous
offers. Because of this relationship, we estimated that earnings would increase with the dollar amount
of a bonus offer.
B.

EVALUATION OF NET BENEFITS
To guide policymakers in applying the results of the pooled analysis and to summarize the

findings, this section presents a comprehensive analysis of the net benefits.of a reemployment bonus
in the VI program. We present estimates of the net benefits (benefits minus costs) for four
hypothetical bonus offers, encompassing the four possible combinations of two bonus amounts ($500
and $1,000) and two bonus qualification periods (6 weeks and 12 weeks). We use constant-amount,
constant-duration bonus offers so that the impacts of the bonus offers on the outcomes used to
evaluate net benefits can be calculated based on the estimated continuous models presented in
Chapters IT, ill, and IV. For each hypothetical bonus offer, we analyze net benefits from the
perspective of claimants, employers, the VI trust funds, the government as a whole, and society as
a whole.
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Our computations of net benefits rely on the predicted impacts of each of the hypothetical bonus
offers on bonus receipt, UI receipt, and earnings, which we presented in Chapters

n, Ill, and N.

Administrative costs are based on the average estimated admin.istrative costs of the Pennsylvania
treatments, which are descnDed in Corsonet a1. (1991). The tables in Appendix A list each individual
benefit and cost, by perspective, for each of the hypothetical bonus offers. Table V.1 contains the
sum of all benefits and costs for each of the hypothetical bonus offers, by perspective. Given that
the estimates of net benefits in Table V.1 are based on simple continuous models of the outcomes
and on hypothetical bonus offers rather than actual bonus offers, we consider the estimates to
represent only rough predictions of the net benefits that would be generated by the hypothetical
bonus offers.
The four hypothetical bonus offers on which Table V.1 is based would, with one exception, yield
positive net benefits for claimants and for society as a whole. For the two $1,000 bonus offers,
claimants would receive bonus payments that, on average, exceed the VI benefits that they would
forego. Consequently, because our predictions imply that the bonus offers would also yield a modest
increase in the earnings of claimants, the claimants would receive estimated net benefits from both
$1,000 bonus offers. For the two $500 bonus offers, claimants would receive bonus payments that
are somewhat lower than the benefits they would forego. However, because the bonus offers would
also increase earnings slightly, claimants would receive net benefits from the $500,6-week offer, and
would nearly break even from the $500, 12-week offer. Society would also receive net benefits from
the bonus offers, with the exception of the $500, 12-week offer, which would yield net losses to
society. The'$l,OOO, 6-week bonus offer would yield the largest net benefits for both claimants and
for society.
The hypothetical bonus offers are generally not cost-effective from the perspective of the VI
system, although the VI system would nearly break even in response to the two $500 bonus offers.
The estimated costs of administering and paying the hypothetical bonus offers exceeds the estimated
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TABLE V,1
ESTIMATED NET BENEFITS OF FOVR HYPOTI-IETICAL BONVS OFFERS,
BY PERSPECTIVE
(Dollars per Claimant)

Perspective
Government
Hypothetical
Bonus Offer

Claimant

VI
Trust Funds

Other
Government

Government
Total

Society

1 - $500, 6 Weeks

51

-7

15

8

59

2 - $500, 12 Weeks

-15

-2

-4

-7

-21

3 - $1,000, 6 Weeks

219

-54

66

12

231

4 - $1,000, 12 Weeks

173

-75

52

-23

150

. rOTE:

The numbers in the table are taken from Tables Al to A4. The estimated benefits and costs of the bonus offers are based
on the estimated continuous models of bonus receipt, VI receipt (in dollars), and earnings presented in Chapters II, III, and
IV. Administrative costs are based on the average estimated administrative costs of the Pennsylvania treatments, which are
described in Corson et al. (1991).
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bonus-induced reduction in benefits. The bonus offers would thus generate net losses to the VI
trust funds, although the net losses for the two $500 offers would be $7 or less. Despite the
estimated net losses to the Ultrust funds, two of the bonus offers-those with a qualification period
of 12 weeks-would generate positive net benefits for the government as a whole.
Several factors may affect the actual net benefits that would be generated by an ongoing
program. FlISt, bonus offers could have different impacts in economic environments that differ from
the economic environments of Pennsylvania and Washington during the demonstrations. Second,
some claimants who stopped collecting VI within the bonus qualification periods in Pennsylvania and
Washington did not claim a bonus. Presumably, a greater percentage of claimants might claim a
bonus in an ongoing program, where the bonus would be part of the regular ill system, thereby
increasing the costs of an ongoing program beyond our estimates. Third, displacement might prevent
any positive impacts on net benefits from occurring in an ongoing program. Displacement would
occur if a bonus-induced reduction in ill receipt were offset by an increase in unemployment and ill
receipt among claimants or other unemployed workers who do not receive a bonus offer. These
claimants may compete for a limited number of job vacancies, precluding any reduction in ill receipt
or increase in earnings. Such an outcome would affect the benefit-cost impacts of an ongoing
program.
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APPENDIX A

SUPPLEMENTAl, BENEFIT-COST TABLES

TABLE Al
BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS OF HYPOTIIETICAL
BONUS OFFER 1 ($$00,6 WEEKS)
(Dollars per Claimant)

Perspective
Government
Benefits and Costs

Claimant

Employer

UI
Trust Funds

Other
Government

Government
Total

Society

Martel Output and Wages
Increased Output
Wages and Fringe Benefitsa

0
91

91
-91

0
0

0
0

0
0

91
0

Tax Payments
Claimants' Taxes

-16

0

1

15

16

0

-69
0

0
0

69
0

0
0

69
0

0
0

0
0

0
0

1
0

0
0

1
0

1
0

Reemployment Bonuses
Local Office Labor Costs
Central Office Labor Costs
Other Costs (Direct and Indirect)

45
0
0
0

0
0
0
0

-45
-18
-10
-5

0
0
0
0

-45
-18
-10
-5

0
-18
-10
-5

Sum 0( Measured Benefits and Ccsts

51

0

-7

15

8

59

Inoome Support Payments
UI Payments
Other Payments
AdmiDistIative Ccsts 0(
Inoome Support Programs

UI Payment Administration
Administration of Other Programs
Demonstration Ccsts

NOTE:

The estimated benefits and costs of the bonus offer are based on the estimated continuous models of bonus receipt, VI receipt
(in dollars), and earnings presented in Chapters II, III, and IV. Administrative costs are based on the average estimated
administrative costs of the Pennsylvania treatments, Which are described in Corson et al. (1991). The Pennsylvania estimate
was used because we believe it represents the best estimate of the administrative costs of an ongoing bonus program. The sums
of the rows or columns of the table may not add due to rounding.

aThe change in total wages and fringe benefits is calculated by adjusting the estimated impacts of the treatments on average earnings to
include additional fringe benefits earned by treatment group members and additional payroll taxes paid by both the employer and
employee.
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TABLE A.2
BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS OF HYPOTHETICAL
BONVS OFFER 2 ($500, 12 WEEKS)
(Dollars per Claimant)

Perspective
Government
Benefits and Costs
Martel Output and Wap
Increased Output
Wages and Fringe Benefitsa

Claimant

Employer

VI
Trust Funds

Other
Government

Government
Total

Society

0
10

10
-10

0
0

0
0

0
0

10
0

5

0

0

-4

-5

0

-101
0

0
0

101
0

0
0

101
0

0
0

0
0

0
0

1
0

0
0

1
0

1
0

Demous1Iatioo Costs
Reemployment Bonuses
Local Office Labor Costs
Central Office Labor Costs
Other Costs (Direct and Indirect)

72
0
0
0

0
0
0
0

-72
-18
-10
-5

0
0
0
0

-72
-18
-10
-5

0
18
-10
-5

Sum of Mauwed Benefits and Costs

-15

0

-2

-4

-7

-21

TaxPaymeDls

Oaimants' Taxes
Income Support PaymeDls

VI Payments
Other Payments
Administrative Costs of
Income Support Programs
VI Payment Administration
Administration of Other Programs

NOTE:

The estimated benefits and costs of the bonus offer are based on the estimated continuous models of bonus receipt, VI receipt
(in dollars), and earnings presented in Chapters II, III, and IV. Administrative costs are based on the average estimated
administrative costs of the Pennsylvania treatments, which are described in Corson et al. (1991). The Pennsylvania estimate
was used because we believe it represents the best estimate of the administrative costs of an ongoing bonus program. The sums
of the rows or columns of the table may not add due to rounding.

aThe change in total wages and fringe benefits is calculated by adjusting the estimated impacts of the treatments on average earnings to
include additional fringe benefits earned by treatment group members and additional payroll taxes paid by both the employer and
employee.
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TABLEA3
BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS OF HYPOTIlETICAL
BONUS OFFER 3 ($1,000, 6 WEEKS)
(Dollars per Claimant)

Perspective
Government
Other
Government

Government
Total

Claimant

Employer

UI
Trust Funds

0
263

263
-263

0
0

0
0

0
0

263
0

-69

0

3

66

69

0

-105
0

0
0

105
0

0
0

105
0

0
0

0
0

0
0

1
0

0
0

1
0

1
0

Demonstration Casts
Reemployment Bonuses
Local Office Labor Costs
Central Office Labor Costs
Other Costs (Direct and Indirect)

129
0
0
0

0
0
0
0

-129
-18
-10
-5

0
0
0
0

-129
-18
-10
-5

0
-18
-10
-5

Sum of Me3lI1IRd Benefits and Casts

219

0

-54

66

12

231

Benefits and Costs

Society

MaItct Output and Wages

Increased Output
Wages and Fringe Benefitsa
Tax Payments
Claimants' Taxes

Income Support Payments
UI Payments
Other Payments
Administrative Casts of
Income Support Programs

UI Payment Administration
Administration of Other Programs

NOTE:

The estimated benefits and costs of the bonus offer are based on the estimated continuous models of bonus receipt, UI receipt
. (in dollars), and earnings presented in Chapters II, III, and IV. Administrative costs are based on the average estimated
administrative costs of the Pennsylvania treatments, which are described in Corson et ai. (1991). The Pennsylvania estimate
was used because we believe it represents the best estimate of the administrative costs of an ongoing bonus program. The sums
of the rows or columns of the table may not add due to rounding.

aThe change in total wages and fringe benefits is calculated by adjusting the estimated impacts of the treatments on average earnings to
include additional fringe benefits earned by treatment group members and additional payroll taxes paid by both the employer and
employee.
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TABLEA4
BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS OF HYPOTIIETICAL
BONUS OFFER 4 ($1,000, 12 WEEKS)
(Dollars per Claimant)

Perspective
Governmel)t
Other
Government

Claimant

Employer

UI
Trusi Funds

0
182

182
-182

0
0

0
0

0
0

182
0

-55

0

2

52

55

0

-137
0

0
0

137
0

0
0

137
0

0
0

0
0

0
0

1
0

0
0

1
0

1
0

Demoas1Iatioa Casts
Reemployment Bonuses
LocaI Office Labor Costs
Central Office Labor Costs
Other Costs (Direct and Indirect)

183
0
0
0

0
0
0
0

-183
-18
-10
-5

0
0
0
0

-183
-18
-10
-5

-18
-10
-5

Sum of Measured Benefits and Casts

173

0

-75

52

-23

150

Benefits and Costs

Government
Total

Society

Martel Output and Wages
Increased Output
Wages and Fringe Benefitsa

TuPaymc:nts
Claimants'Taxes
Income SUpport Payments
UI Payments
Other Payments
.AdmiDilltnl1ive Casts of
Income SUpport Programs
UI Payment Administration
Administration of Other Programs

NOTE:

-0

The estimated benefits and costs of the bonus offer are based on the estimated continuous models of bonus receipt, UI receipt
(in dollars), and earnings presented in Chapters II, III, and N. Administrative costs are based on the average estimated
administrative costs of the Pennsylvania treatments, which are described in Corson et aI. (1991). The Pennsylvania estimate
was used because we believe it represents the best estimate of the administrative costs of an ongoing bonus program. The sums
of the rows or columns of the table may not add due to rounding.

8The change in total wages and fringe benefits is calculated by adjusting the estimated impacts of the treatments on average earnings to
include additional fringe benefits earned by treatment group members and additional payroll taxes paid by both the employer and
employee.
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UI OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES

The Unemployment Insurance Occasional Paper Series presents
research findings and analyses dealing with unemployment
insurance issues. Papers are prepared by research contractors,
staff members of the unemployment insurance system, or individual
researchers. Manuscripts and comments from interested
individuals are welcomed. All correspondence should be sent to:
UI Occasional Paper Series
UIS, ETA, Department of Labor
200 Constitution Ave, N.W. Room S4519
Washington, D.C. 20210
Arrangements have been made for the sale of most of the reports
in the series through a Federal information and retrieval system,
the National Technical Information Service (NTIS). Copies of the
reports are available from NTIS in paper or microfiche. The NTIS
accession number and the price for the paper copy are listed
after the title of each paper. The price for a microfiche copy
of a paper is $4.50. To obtain the papers from NTIS, the
remittance must accompany the order and be made payable to:
National Technical Information Service
U.S. Department of Commerce
5285 Port Royal Road
Springfield, Virginia 22161
Telephone: (703) 557-4650
Papers which are not available are indicated with an asterisk.

G. Joachim Elterich and Linda Graham,
Impact of Extension of Coverage to
Agricultural Workers Under P.L. 94-566,
Their Characteristics and Economic Welfare,
University of Deleware.
NTIS PB83-147819. Price: $11.50

77-1

G. Joachim Elterich and Linda Graham,
Impact of P.L. 94-566 on Agricultural
Employers and Unemployment Insurance
Trust Funds in Selected states,
University of Deleware.
NTIS PB83-147827. Price: $8.50

77-2

*David stevens, Unemployment Insurance
Beneficiary Job Search Behavior: What
Is Known and What Should Be Known for
Administrative Planning Purposes,
University of Missouri.

77-3

*Michael Klausner, Unemployment Insurance
and the Work Disincentive Effect: An
Examination of Recent Research,
Unemployment Insurance Service.

77-4

*Gary Solon, Weekly Benefit Amounts and
Normal Weekly Wages of Unemployment
Insurance Claimants, Unemployment
Insurance Service.

77-5

*Ruth Entes, Family support and Expenditures
Survey of Unemployment Insurance Claimants
in New York State, September 1972-February
1974, New York State Department of Labor.

77-6

*Saul Blaustein and Paul Mackin, Development
of the Weekly Benefit Amount in Unemployment
Insurance, Upjohn Institute.

77-7

*Saul Blaustein and Paul Mackin, Job Loss,
Family Living Standards, and the Adequacy of
Weekly Unemployment Benefits, Upjohn Institute

77-8

Henry Felder and Richard West, The Federal
Supplemental Benefits Program: National
ExPerience and the Impact of P.L. 95-19, SRI
International.
NTIS PB83-149633. Price: $11.50.

78-1

Paul Burgess, Jerry Kingston and Chris Walters,
The Adequacy of Unemployment Insurance Benefits:
An Analysis of Weekly Benefits Relative to
Preunemployment ExPenditure Levels, Arizona
Department of Economic Security and Arizona
State University.
NTIS PB83-148528. Price: $17.50.

78-2

Christopher Pleatsikas, Lawrence Bailis and
Judith Dernburg, A Study of Measures of Substantial Attachment to the Labor Force, Volumes I and
II, Urban Systems Research and Engineering,Inc.
Vol I: NTIS PB83-147561. Price $13.00
Vol. II: NTIS PB83-147579. Price: $14.50

78-3

Henry Felder and Randall P02:dena, The Federal
Supplemental Benefits Program: Impact of
P.L. 95-19 on Individual Rec:ipients. SRI
International.
NTIS PB83-149179. Price: ~:13. 00

78-4

*Peter Kauffman, Margaret KaLuffman, Michael
Werner and Christine Jennison, An Analysis of
Some of the Effects of Incre!asing the Duration
of Regular Unemployment Insurance Benefits,
Management Engineers, Inc.

78-5

Jerry Kingston, Paul Burgess: and Chris Walters,
The Adequacy of Unemployment. Insurance Benefits:
An Analysis of Adjustments Undertaken Throuqh
Thirteen and Twenty-Five Weeks of Unemployment,
Arizona Department of Economlic Security and
Arizona State University.
NTIS PB83-149823. Price: $19.00

78-6

Walter Nicholson and Walter Corson, The Effect
of State Laws and Economic Factors on Exhaustion
Rates for Regular Unemployment Insurance Benefits:
A Statistical Model, Mathematica Policy Research.
NTIS PB83-149468. Price $14.50

78-7

Louis Benenson, Incidence of Federal Retirees
Drawing UCFE Benefits. 1974-75. UnemploYment
Insurance Service.
NTIS PB83-161927. Price: $7.00

78-8

Henry Felder, A Statistical Evaluation of the
Impact of Disqualification Provisions of State
Unemployment Insurance Laws. SRI International.
NTIS PB83-152272. Price: $17.50

79-1

Arthur Denzau, Ronald Oaxaca and Carol Taylor,
The Impact of Unemployment Insurance Benefits
on Local Economies--Tucson, University of
Arizona.
NTIS PB83-169912. Price: $:11.50

79-2

Paul Burgess, Jerry Kingston and the Research
and Reports section of the UnemploYment Insurance
Bureau, Arizona Department of Economic Security,
Labor Market Experiences of Unemployment
Insurance Exhaustees. Arizona Department of
Economic Security and Arizona State University.
NTIS PB83-224162. Price: $:~2. 00

79-3

Carolyn Sperber, An Evaluation of CUrrent and
Alternative Methods of Determining Exhaustion
Ratios, Unemployment Insurance Service.
NTIS PB83-148866. Price: $8.50

79-4

Mamoru Ishikawa, Unemployment Compensation in
Varying Phases of Joblessness, Unemployment
Insurance Service.
NTIS PB83-150581. Price: $8.50

79-5

Nicholas Kiefer and George Neumann, The Effect
of Alternative Partial Benefit Formulas on
Beneficiary Part-Time Work Behavior, National
Opinion Research Center.
NTIS PB83-146811. Price: $11.50

79-6

1980
Mamoru Iskikawa, Unemployment Insurance and
Proliferation of Other Income Protection Programs
for Experienced Workers, Unemployment Insurance Service.
NTIS PB83-140657. Price: $10.00

80-1

UI Research Exchange~ Information on unemployment
insurance research. First issue: 1980,
Unemployment Insurance Service.
NTIS PB83-148411. Price: $17.50.

8.0-2

Raymond P.F. Fishe and G.S. -Maddala, Effect of
Unemployment Insurance on Duration of Unemployment: A Study Based on CWBH Data for Florida.
Florida State university and University of Florida.
PB88-162464. Price: $19.95

80-3

*Jerry Kingston, Paul Burgess, Robert st. Louis
and Joseph Sloane, Benefit Adequacy and UI Program
Costs: Simulations with Alternative Weekly Benefit
Formulas, Arizona Department of Economic Security
and Arizona State University.

80-4

UI Research Exchanae. Information on unemployment
insurance research. First issue: 1981.
Unemployment Insurance service.
NTIS PB83-152587. Price: $19.00

81-1

Jerry Kingston, Paul Burgess, Robert st. Louis and
Joseph Sloane, Can Benefit Adeguacy Be Predicted
on the Basis of UI Claims and CWBH Data? Arizona
Department of Economic Security and Arizona State
University.
NTIS PB83-140566. Price: $8.50

81-2

Paul Burgess, Jerry Kingstc>n, Robert st. Louis and
Joseph Sloane, Changes in Spending Patterns Foll,owing Unemplovment, Arizona Department of Economic
Security and Arizona State University.
NTIS PB83-148833. Price: $8.50

81-3

UI Research Exchange. InfClrmation on unemploYment
insurance research. Second issue: 1981,
UnemploYment Insurance Service.
NTIS PB83-148429. Price: $14.50

81-4

Walter Corson and Walter Ni.cholson, An Analysis of
Ul Recipients' Unemployment: Spells, Mathematica
Policy Research.
NTIS PB84-151463. Price: $14.50

83-1

Lois Blanchard and Walter Corson, A Guide to the
Analysis of UI Recipients' Unemployment Spells Using
a Supplemented CWBH Data Se~ Mathematica Policy
Research.
NTIS PB84-151471. Price: $16.00

83-2

Ronald L. Oaxaca and Carol A. Taylor, The Effects
of Aggregate Unempl,oymentInsurance Benefits in the
U.S. on the Operation of a Local Economy., University
of Arizona.
NTIS PB84-150317. Price: $10.00

83-3

UI Research Exchange. Information on unemploYment
insurance research. 1983 issue. UnemploYment
Insurance Service.
NTIS PB84-150325. Price: $14.50

83-4

UI Research Exchange. Information on unemploYment
insurance research. 1984 issue. UnemploYment
Insurance Service.
NTIS PB85-180370. Price: $17.50

84-1

stephen Wandner, John Robinson and Helen Manheimer.
Unemployment Insurance Schemes in Developing
countries, Unemployment Insurance Service.
NTIS PB85-185098/AS,. Price: $11.50

84-2
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Walter Corson and Walter Nicholson, An Analysis of
the 1981-82 Changes in the Extended Benefit Program,
Mathematica Policy Research.
NTIS PB85-176287/AS., Price: $13.00

85-1

Walter Corson, David Long and Walter Nicholson,
Evaluation of the Charleston Claimant Placement and
Work Test Demonstration, Mathematica Policy Research.
NTIS PB85-152965. Price: $14.50

85-2

Walter Corson, Alan Hershey, Stuart Kerachsky,
Paul Rynders and John Wichita, Application of
the Unemployment Insurance System Work Test and
Nonmonetary Eligibility Standards, Mathematica Policy
Research.
NTIS PB85-169910/AS. Price: $17.50

85-3

Robert Moffitt, The Effect of the Duration of
Unemployment Benefits on Work Incentives: An
Analysis of Four Data Sets, Mathematica Policy
Research.
NTIS PB85-170546. Price: $14.50

85-4

Helen Manheimer and Evangeline Cooper, Beginning
the Unemployment Insurance Program--An Oral History,
Unemployment Insurance Service.
NTIS PB87-117370/AS. Price: $16.95

85-5

Helen Manheimer, John Robinson, Norman Harvey,
William Sheehan and Burman Skrable, Alternatiye
Uses of Unemployment Insurance, Unemployment
Insurance Service.
NTIS PB87-118402/AS. Price: $16.95

86-1

Norman Harvey, Unemployment Insurance Bibliography,
Unemployment Insurance Service.
NTIS PB87-118410/AS. Price: "$21.95

86-2

Walter Corson, Jean Grossman and Walter Nicholson,
An Evaluation of the Federal Supplemental
Compensation Program, Mathematica Policy Research.
NTIS PB86-163144. Price: $16.95

86-3

stuart Kerachsky, Walter Nicholson and Alan Hershey,
An Evaluation of Short-Time compensation Programs,
Mathematica Policy Research.
NTIS PB86-167616. Price: $22.95

86-4

James M. Rosbrow, Fifty Years ofUnemplQyment
Insurance--A Legislative History: 1935-1985,
UnemploYment Insurance Service.
NTIS PB87-179834/AS. Price: $18.95
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Stephen A. Wandner, (editor) Measuring Structural
Unemployment, UnemploYment Insurance Service.
NTIS PB87-209433/AS. Price: $18.95
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1987
Burt Barnow and Wayne Vroman, An Analysis of UI
Trust Fund Adequacy, UnemploYment Insurance Service.
NTIS PB87-209342. Price: $6.95

87-1

Esther Johnson, Short-Time Compensation: A Handbook
Basic Source Material,UnemploYment Insurance Service
NTIS PB88-163589 Price: $19.95

87-2

Walter Corson, Stuart Kerachsky and Ellen Eliason
Kisker, Work Search Among Unemployment Insurance
Claimants: An Investigation of Some Effects of
State Rules and Enforcement. Mathematica Policy
Research.
NTIS PB89-160022/AS. Price: $28.95

88-1

UI Research Exchange. Information on unemploYment
insurance research. 1988 issue. UnemploYment
Insurance Service.
NTIS PB89-160030/AS. Price: $21.95

88-2

Walter Corson and Walter Ni.cholson, An Examination
of Declining UI Claims During the 1980s.
Mathematica Policy Research.
NTIS PB89-160048/AS. Price: $21.95

88-3

Phillip Richardson, Albert Irion, Arlen Rosenthal
and Harold Kuptzin, Referral of Long-Term
Unemployment Insurance (UI) Claimants to
Reemployment Services. First Edition. Macro
Systems and Mathematica Policy Research.
NTIS PB89-153100/AS. Price $28.95

88-4

Walter Corson, Walter Nicholson and stuart
Kerachsky, The Secretary's Seminars on
Unemployment Insurance. Mathematica Policy
Research.
NTIS PB90-216649. Price: $23.00

89-1

Phillip Richardson, Albert Irion, Arlen Rosenthal
and Harold Kuptzin, Referral of Long-Term
Unemployment Insurance (UI) Claimants to
Reemployment Services. Second Edition.
Systems and Mathematica Policy Research.
NTIS PB89-153100/AS. Price: $28.95

89-2
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NTIS PB90-216714. Price: $45.00

89-3

UI Research Exchange. Information on unemployment
insurance research. 1989 issue. Unemployment
Insurance Service.
NTIS PB90-114125/AS. Price: $23.00

89-4

John L. Czajka, Sharon L.Long, and Walter Nicholson,
An Evaluation of the Feasibility of a Substate Area
Extended Benefit Program. Mathematic Policy Research.
NTIS PB90-127531/AS. Price: $31.00

89-5

Wayne Vroman, Experience Rating in Unemployment
Insurance: Some CUrrent Issues. The Urban Institute.
NTIS PB90-216656. Price: $23.00

89-6

Jack Bright, Leadership in Appellate Administration:
Successful State Unemployment Insurance Appellate
Operations. Unemployment Insurance Service.
NTIS PB90-161183/AS. Price: $23.00

89-7
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System Prototype. Evaluation Research Corporation
NTIS PB90-232711. Price: $17'.00
Esther R. Johnson, Reemployment Services To
Unemployed Workers Having DifficUlty Becoming
Reemployed. Unemployment Insurance Service.
NTIS PB91-106849. Price: $31.00.
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Available soon at NTIS.

92-1

Stephen A. Wandner, (editor) Self Employment Programs
for Unemployed Workers. UnemploYment Insurance Service.
NTIS PB92-191626/AS. Price: $35.00.
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92-3

UI Research Exchanqe.. Information on UnemploYment
insurance research. 1992 issue.
UnemploYment Insurance Service.
NTIS PB93-117968. Price: $36.50.

92-4

Wayne D. Zajac and David E. Balducchi, (editors)
Papers and Materials Presented at the Unemployment
Insurance Expert Syst:em Colloquium, June 1991.
UnemploYment Insurance Service.
'
Available soon at NTIS.

92-5

*u.s. COVERNMENT PRlNT1NCOFflCE: 19"3.342.561(74430

